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New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, 
Papua, and Solomon Islands are not 
reviewed in this issue. 
Fiji
For the most part, 2015 was a good 
year for the government led by Josaia 
Voreqe “Frank” Bainimarama. With 
59 percent of the 2014 national vote 
at the September 2014 election, and 
32 of the 50 seats in Parliament, the 
governing FijiFirst Party had a strong 
mandate. In view of the disarray of 
the Opposition, FijiFirst had good 
prospects of winning the next election, 
scheduled for 2018. Robust economic 
growth continued for a third succes-
sive year in 2015, and the government 
sustained its modernizing agenda with 
extensive infrastructure spending as 
well as legal and educational reforms. 
Nevertheless, stability remains elusive. 
Sections of the indigenous commu-
nity are deeply hostile to the FijiFirst 
administration. The Republic of 
Fiji Military Forces (rfmf) remains 
determined to clamp down firmly 
on any potential or perceived threat. 
Efforts by Police Commissioner Ben 
Groenewald, an expatriate South 
African, to bring to justice members 
of the security forces for human-rights 
abuses were frustrated by rfmf inter-
vention. In November, Groenewald 
resigned, more in despair than protest. 
The Fiji economy is growing 
strongly. Two sluggish years (2.7% 
gross domestic product [gdp] growth 
in 2011, 1.8% in 2012) have been 
followed by three years of more rapid 
expansion: 4.6 percent in 2013, 3.8 
percent in 2014, and an expected 4.3 
percent in 2015 (adb 2015a; imf 
2015). Despite this, Fiji’s gdp per 
capita remains below the level reached 
in 2006 (Chand 2015, 204). Tourism 
and remittance earnings have been the 
main drivers of growth, while sugar 
has continued to stagnate with many 
farmers exiting the industry and a con-
traction of the land area under cane 
cultivation. Visitor arrivals over 2015 
were substantially above 2012–2014 
levels, and capital investment during 
2013–2015 has been sustained above 
25 percent of gdp—driven upward by 
heavy public spending on roads and 
bridges (rbf 2015). In May, Standard 
& Poor’s raised Fiji’s sovereign credit 
rating from b to b+. In September, 
the Fiji government was able to roll 
over its 2016 maturing loan, with 
a fresh f$200 million bond at 6.6 
percent interest (f$1.00 is equivalent 
to around us$0.46). Public debt has 
fallen from 55 percent of gdp in 2010 
to 49.5 percent in 2015 (adb 2015b, 
5), excluding the liabilities of state-
owned corporations (entailing approx-
imately an additional 30% of gdp). 
The sugar industry remains deeply 
troubled, despite some improvement 
over 2011–2014. The Fiji Sugar Cor-
poration (fsc) was suspended from 
the Suva stock exchange owing to 
severe financial difficulties in October 
2009 and was officially delisted in 
2010. It reported negative earnings of 
f$36.8 million in 2009 and f$179.1 
million in 2010, but thereafter showed 
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some signs of recovery with operating 
losses claimed to be diminishing from 
f$32 million in 2011 to f$14 million 
in 2012, f$10 million in 2013, and 
f$5 million in 2014 (Fiji Times, 14 
May 2015; Narsey 2015a). Accord-
ing to the official figures, the govern-
ment paid f$175 million in 2010 and 
f$36.5 million in 2012 to cover fsc 
deficits (Fiji Times, 13 Feb 2015). The 
fsc reported assets of f$227 million 
in 2014, but its liabilities amounted to 
f$374 million (fsc 2014). According 
to National Federation Party (nfp) 
leader Biman Prasad, the number of 
sugarcane growers has fallen from 
18,000 to 13,000 over 2007–2015 
(Fiji Times, 13 Feb 2015). Many of 
those “farmers” who remain now 
cultivate diminished plots solely to pay 
their Taukei Land Trust Board (tltb) 
rents but rely on ancillary incomes 
for other basic needs. Farmers report 
increasing difficulty recruiting cane 
cutters at harvesting time. 
Partial stabilization over 2012–
2014 occurred with assistance from 
US-owned refiner Tate & Lyle, which 
continues to purchase the bulk of Fiji 
sugar for European markets. The relief 
is likely to be temporary. Fiji sugar 
prices had widely been expected to 
decrease over 2009–2015 in tandem 
with the 36 percent phased decline 
in the European Union’s officially 
declared “reference price.” In ear-
lier years, the European Union (EU) 
reference price had fluctuated around 
two or three times the price paid for 
raw sugar on the open world market. 
Until 2010, the price actually paid 
by European refiners for sugar from 
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) countries (including Fiji) closely 
tracked the reference price. After the 
European Union announced its phased 
decline, however, actual EU  market 
prices diverged sharply upward 
above the EU reference price over 
2011–2013 (ec 2015). This assisted 
Fiji’s sugar earnings, as did the 20 
percent Fiji devaluation in 2009 and 
“Fairtrade” premiums paid by Tate 
& Lyle. (“Fairtrade” certification is 
a device to improve earnings for cane 
growers if the industry meets certain 
standards; see Fairtrade International 
2015.) Subsequently, over 2013–2014, 
the EU market price fell to closer to 
the official reference price, and as of 
late 2015 both the EU official price 
and the actual market price paid were 
close to levels on the open world 
market (ec 2016). Refiners like Tate 
& Lyle have effectively been restricted 
to supplies from ACP countries by 
 sizable EU tariffs on non-ACP sugar, 
thus encouraging a divergence between 
the European internal/ACP sugar 
price and the world market price, but 
preferential access to the European 
market will end in 2017, after which 
fsc Chief Executive Officer Abdul 
Khan anticipates a 30 percent price 
decline (Fiji Times, 18 July 2015). Tate 
& Lyle’s 2015 decision to cancel the 
Fairtrade premium (around 15%) paid 
to Fiji growers eliminated another 
important lifeline for the industry (Fiji 
Times, 11 Aug 2015). 
The 2015 budget set out ambitious 
targets for privatization, with earnings 
anticipated to reach f$507 million 
over the year (imf 2014; FijiLive, 21 
April 2015), but the most significant 
divestments have been to the coun-
try’s main pension provider, the Fiji 
National Provident Fund (fnpf). In 
November, government announced a 
f$100 million partnership deal for 59 
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percent of the shares of the hitherto 
wholly government–owned Fiji Ports 
Corporation Ltd, with the fnpf to 
purchase 39 percent and Sri Lankan–
based company Aitken Spence to 
acquire a 20 percent stake (Fiji Sun, 
10 Nov 2015; Fiji Government 2015). 
In 2013, Aitken Spence had acquired 
51 percent of Fiji Ports Terminal Ltd, 
which manages the Suva and Lautoka 
international ports, with government 
retaining a 49 percent share (Fiji Sun, 
3 Feb 2015). In December, the govern-
ment sold half of its remaining stake 
in Amalgamated Telecom  Holdings 
Group (ath) for f$89 million, mostly 
to the fnpf (Fiji Times, 23 Dec 2015). 
ath subsidiaries include Telecom Fiji 
Limited, Internet Services Fiji (Con-
nect), Fiji International Telecoms (fin-
tel), and, since July 2014, the 100 
percent locally owned Vodafone Fiji 
Ltd (ath 2014). Major state assets, 
such as the Fiji Electricity Authority 
and Airports Fiji Ltd, have proved 
more difficult to sell. The fnpf, which 
faces heavy restrictions on foreign 
investment, owns f$4.5 billion in 
net assets, most of which have been 
transferred from government entities 
(fnpf 2014). 
The 2016 budget reduced the value-
added tax (vat) from 15 percent to 
9 percent, reversing a rise signaled in 
the 2011 budget. At the same time, 
the zero duty on some basic food-
stuffs and medicines was removed. So 
the net effect does not entail a major 
reduction in government vat earnings. 
To boost revenues, the Service Turn-
over Tax was doubled from 5 percent 
to 10 percent, and a new 6 percent 
“Environment Levy” was imposed on 
tourism operators, entailing a major 
shift in government taxation toward 
reliance on greater sourcing from Fiji’s 
biggest industry. Regular switches in 
government policy and absence of con-
sultation with stakeholders are often 
seen as harmful to commercial con-
fidence, but Fiji business leaders—as 
well as offshore companies operating 
in Fiji—remain mostly supportive of 
the Bainimarama-led administration. 
The projected 2015 budget deficit was 
a modest 2.5 percent of gdp (Dornan 
2014), but the government split its 
roads and infrastructure expenditure 
to spread the load over 2015–2016.
The results of the 2014 polls indi-
cated an electoral calculation likely 
to be sustained over the medium term 
(see Fraenkel 2015a, 2015c). With 
proportions of the population now 
tilted around 62 percent/34 percent 
in favor of i-Taukei (as indigenous 
Fijians are now called under the 
2013 Constitution) compared to Fiji 
Indians, the 2014 outcome turned 
on the ethnic Fijian vote, which was 
split between Bainimarama’s FijiFirst 
Party and the major Opposition party 
sodelpa (better known by its acro-
nym than by its full title, the Social 
Democratic Liberal Party. sodelpa 
is the largely indigenous Fijian party 
of the government that was deposed 
in the 2006 coup. It was forced by a 
decree abolishing Fijian party names 
to stop calling itself Soqosoqo Dua-
vata ni Lewenivanua and then by 
another decree to drop the acronym 
sdl. It opted for “sodelpa” to retain 
the publicly well-known initials sdl). 
The Fiji-Indian vote for FijiFirst is 
much more assured and unlikely to go 
to any other party. With some justifi-
cation, Bainimarama could claim that 
“under my Government, the iTaukei 
[sic] are more secure, have more 
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opportunities” and he could point to 
state delivery of “better roads, better 
housing, better medical facilities, free 
medicine, [and] free water” (quoted in 
FijiLive, 30 April 2015; note that the 
“i” in i-Taukei is the definite article, 
so stating “the i-Taukei” is like saying 
“the the indigenous Fijians”). Many 
Taukei had switched to FijiFirst in 
2014 because of these developments, 
but it is still too early to assess the 
impact of Bainimarama’s reform 
program, critical features of which 
commenced only in the run-up to the 
2014 polls. What is clear is that the 
next election will likewise depend on 
the battle for the indigenous vote, and 
much of the energy of the government 
over 2015 was directed toward sus-
taining and building on that support.
Fiji’s Parliament, now returned to 
its pre-1987 coup location in central 
Suva, still echoes the bitter rivalries 
associated with the 2006 military 
takeover. In February, an Opposition 
 member called the prime minister 
“kaisi” (person of low rank) in Parlia-
ment, echoing the cleavage between 
high-ranking Taukei chiefs on the 
Opposition side and those outside the 
traditional indigenous establishment 
on the government side. Bainima-
rama, who was commander of the 
rfmf until March 2014, retorted that 
Parliament should work like a mili-
tary establishment, where “nobody 
really gives two hoots about your title, 
supposedly your blue blood” (Fiji 
Times, 8 March 2015; FijiLive, 10 
Feb 2015). In May, sodelpa’s Ratu 
Naiqama Lalabalavu, the Tui Cakau 
(paramount chief of Cakaudrove, 
with authority extending into Bua and 
Macuata provinces) was suspended 
for two years for uttering obsceni-
ties against the Speaker, Jiko Luveni 
(Fiji Sun, 22 May 2015). Opposition 
leader Ro Teimumu Kepa, Roko Tui 
Dreketi (paramount chief of Rewa and 
the broader Burebasaga confederacy) 
said the suspension was an abuse of 
powers by the Speaker, and sodelpa 
briefly boycotted Parliament (rnzi, 
22 May 2015; FijiLive, 6 July 2015). 
In the budget debate in November, 
sodelpa’s Isoa Tikoca—in a charac-
teristically gruff voice—accused the 
government of corruption. Attorney 
General Sayed-Khaiyum reacted by 
parodying that voice and gesturing 
with arms akimbo like a monkey. 
When accused of racism, Sayed-Khai-
yum claimed to have been mimicking 
the voice of Darth Vader from the 
movie Star Wars (Fiji Sun, 21 Nov 
2015). Few could recall such gestures 
by those on the “dark side.”
The paired authority of Bainima-
rama (now civilian prime minister, 
minister of i-Taukei affairs and sugar) 
and Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum (now 
attorney general, minister of finance, 
public enterprises, public service, and 
communications) has been accentu-
ated in the wake of the 2014 polls. 
Sayed-Khaiyum runs much of the 
business of the government, while 
Bainimarama embarks on frequent 
official trips around Fiji and overseas. 
Sayed-Khaiyum (of Muslim descent) 
is often reviled by conservative ethnic 
Fijians and anti-regime blogsites as 
spearheading an “Islamic takeover,” 
and he travels within Fiji with a strong 
personal security detail. By contrast, 
Bainimarama is regularly celebrated as 
a compassionate and accessible leader 
who is sensitive to the interests of 
i-Taukei. Bainimarama welcomes text 
messages on his mobile phone to alert 
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him to respond to the plight of Fiji 
citizens but leaves Sayed-Khaiyum—as 
finance minister—to fund the associ-
ated expenditures. Casualties of the 
new order often report that their ter-
mination was ordered after they had 
fallen out with the attorney general. 
Reports of military disquiet centered 
on Sayed-Khaiyum were confirmed in 
2011 by now-imprisoned former Land 
Force Commander Pita Driti and the 
exiled former Third Infantry Regiment 
commander, Ratu Tevita Mara (who 
now resides in Tonga). Another former 
military officer, Pio Tikoduadua, min-
ister for infrastructure and transport 
(but formerly permanent secretary in 
the Prime Minister’s Office, 2009–
2014) resigned his parliamentary seat 
in May 2015, ostensibly for health 
reasons (Tikoduadua 2015; FijiLive, 
11 May 2015). Within Fiji, his rift 
with the attorney general was public 
knowledge, at least among the urban 
elite, but so too were the whispered 
allegations about financial misman-
agement in his ministry. 
Throughout 2015, FijiFirst made 
ample use of its majority on the floor 
of Parliament. By the end of 2015, 
the splendidly refurbished Parlia-
ment website reported forty-eight acts 
passed and 184 divisions since Octo-
ber 2014 (in parliamentary procedure, 
a “division” is an alternative to a 
voice vote in which members of Parlia-
ment rise from their seats). Leaving 
aside absences, the government side 
remained solid in all 184 votes, aside 
from just three occasions when there 
was a single dissenting vote and two 
cases of abstention. The Opposition 
was only slightly less homogenous, 
with the fifteen sodelpa and three 
nfp members of Parliament vot-
ing as a bloc on nearly all occasions 
(Fiji Parliament 2015). In April, the 
government announced that schools 
that once served as bastions of indig-
enous chiefly authority, such as Queen 
Victoria School, Adi Cakobau School, 
and Ratu Kadavulevu School, would 
henceforth cater primarily for rural 
students (Fiji Times, 2 April 2015; 
Islands Business, 14 April 2014). Ro 
Teimumu said it was part of the plan 
to destroy Fijian institutions and a 
continuation of the strategy that had 
seen Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs dis-
banded in 2012 (abc, 13 April 2015). 
Over 2015, sodelpa chose to make 
indigenous rights its primary focus. At 
the 14th session of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues in New York in April, pro- and 
anti-government representatives did 
battle with each other on the issue 
of whether or not those rights were 
adequately protected under Fiji’s 2013 
constitution (FijiLive, 23 April 2015). 
Other issues, such as corruption 
and human rights abuses, obtained 
a lesser focus. Speaker Jiko Luveni 
had allowed the Opposition to take 
chairmanship of the Public Accounts 
Committee (pac), triggering some 
controversy in her FijiFirst party. 
Opposition leader Ro Teimumu Kepa 
appointed nfp leader Biman Prasad 
to take the post. Most of the issues 
raised in the pac’s May 2015 Consoli-
dated Report on the auditor general’s 
2007–2009 reports concerned cases 
of maladministration of government 
finances rather than evidence of gross 
corruption. The report highlighted 
cases of extravagance, weak tendering 
and procurement, and poor collection 
of revenues (pac 2015). Neverthe-
less, the government was angered by 
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this novel scrutiny of its expenditures, 
and Sayed-Khaiyum claimed that the 
pac was acting beyond its jurisdiction 
(rnzi, 27 July 2015). Parliamentary 
deliberation was clearly vexing those 
accustomed to rule by decree. In July, 
the government used its majority to 
secure a reduction in sitting times, 
from seven to four weeks (Fiji Times, 
9 July 2015) 
In its 2014 annual report, the Fiji 
Independent Commission against 
Corruption (ficac) recorded 79 
convictions since its inception in 
2007; 26 cases acquitted, withdrawn, 
or declared nolle prosequi (charges 
discontinued); and 121 cases pend-
ing. Scores were still being settled 
with those associated with the ousted 
pre-2006 government. Former tltb 
Chief Executive Kalivati Bakani and 
his director, Keni Dakuidreketi, were 
sent to prison for three and six years, 
respectively, and the chief executive 
and directors of the Fiji Post were 
handed down jail sentences, but two 
cases were dropped against deposed 
Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase due 
to “insufficient evidence” (ficac 
2015). ficac is an institution that 
“sends shivers down some people’s 
spines,” boasted the attorney general 
as ficac’s employees assembled for 
their annual awards night (Fiji Sun, 
17 Jan 2016). Cabinet ministers feel 
less threatened. Allegations that the 
government was—over 2010–2011—
secretly paying unspecified ministe-
rial salaries through Aliz Pacific, 
an accounting firm owned by the 
attorney general’s aunt, Nur Bano 
Ali, were confirmed by the Auditor 
General’s Office in 2014 (for details, 
see Fraenkel 2015b). In October 2015, 
the government tentatively released 
restricted additional information to 
the media, along with the explanation 
that “the contracting out of payroll 
service was deemed necessary at that 
time to  create efficiency and maintain 
confidentiality of personal information 
given the political and administrative 
climate” (Fiji Sun, 8 Oct 2015). The 
report said that such irregular pay-
ments had since been discontinued, 
but it did not reveal the amounts 
involved (see Narsey 2015b). 
The fallout from the 2014 elec-
tion defeat has taken a heavy toll on 
sodelpa. In August 2015, an internal 
party document, the Gaunavinaka 
report, was leaked to the media. It 
revealed considerable disquiet about 
the party’s leadership and aired allega-
tions of mishandling of Opposition 
office funds. The authors accused 
the sodelpa leadership of aiming to 
“paddle their political ambitions” but 
without “conviction for the indige-
nous cause.” It claimed that the “pub-
lic is of the opinion that the Leader of 
the Opposition is weak, has no vision 
and has compromised the principles 
of the party with her hidden agendas 
to cling to power.” Ro Teimumu was 
berated for lack of consultation and 
was told to support any caucus deci-
sion “whether it’s right or wrong” 
(Bulitavu and Radrodro 2015). One 
of the report’s authors, Member of 
Parliament Mosese Bulitavu, threat-
ened to resign unless action was taken 
and claimed to have the backing of 
the Bua, Cakaudrove, and Macuata 
sodelpa offices (Fiji Sun, 19 Aug 
2015). From Burebasaga, the loyal 
Jese Sikivou wrote that the “vanua 
of Rewa” was deeply hurt about the 
allegations against their chief (Sikivou 
2015). Gaunavinaka report authors 
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were equally offended by claims that 
Ratu Naiqama, the Tui Cakau, was 
“asking [for] money” from “embar-
rassed Fijians” while on tour in Amer-
ica (Bulitavu and  Radrodro 2015).
The schism stopped short of cul-
minating in a sodelpa split in 2015. 
Ratu Naiqama distanced himself 
from the Gaunavinaka report, and 
in September Ro Teimumu and Ratu 
Naiqama issued a joint statement 
rejecting claims of a rift between them 
(rnzi, 1 Sept 2015). After the release 
of the report, 1992–1999 prime 
minister and 1987 coup leader Sitiveni 
Rabuka resigned from the party, 
claiming that sodelpa was headed 
toward self-destruction and evidently 
frustrated that Ro Teimumu’s faction 
had blocked his leadership aspira-
tions (Rabuka 2015). Bulitavu was 
pardoned by sodelpa’s management 
board in order to prevent further 
ruptures. An internal investigative 
team headed by former Permanent 
Secretary Anare Jale found some 
support for allegations of financial 
impropriety. Principal Administration 
Manager at the Office of the Leader of 
the Opposition Mick Beddoes—a rare 
part-European politician in the other-
wise fairly solidly Taukei sodelpa 
firmament—was sacrificed in Decem-
ber. The gloating Fiji Sun, which had 
triumphantly exposed the Gaunavi-
naka turmoil, described the departing 
Beddoes as “Mr Unpopular” and “the 
Man with the Donald Trump Mouth” 
(Fiji Sun, 31 Dec 2015). It was the end 
of a fifteen-year political career for 
a man who had traversed the spec-
trum of Fiji politics from leader of the 
Opposition under the sdl govern-
ments (2002–2004, 2006) to sodelpa 
stalwart. 
In October, Bulitavu wrote to 
the Fiji Sun denouncing sodelpa’s 
efforts to restore Fiji’s Great Council 
of Chiefs on the grounds that this 
was a vehicle for the supremacy of 
Bau Island (off the eastern coast of 
Fiji’s main island, Viti Levu) through 
the confederacy system (Bau was the 
home of Ratu Seru Cakobau, who 
ceded Fiji to Queen Victoria in 1874). 
The claims of the Vunivalu kei Bau 
(paramount chief of Bau) to serve 
as the “supreme chief of the iTaukei 
people” were repudiated in favor 
of the ancient and supposedly more 
egalitarian claims of the Ratu Mai 
Verata (Verata is located to the north 
of Bau, also on Viti Levu’s east coast). 
Tribes on Vanua Levu (Fiji’s second 
largest island) were said to recognize 
that their “Vu” (first ancestor) came 
from Verata and to have honored “a 
tax system of i sevu” entailing trib-
utes from Wailevu, Labasa, Savusavu, 
Natewa Bay, and Udu Point (in the 
extreme east of Vanua Levu). Buli-
tavu’s article called on the Bainima-
rama government to “realign the 
tribal history” in accordance “with 
the preamble of the 2013 Constitu-
tion” by conferring authority on this 
“Verata ancient heritage.” The govern-
ment was also enjoined to renounce 
“the breach of tribal rights surround-
ing the signing of the Deed of Ces-
sion 1874” (Fiji Sun, 10 Oct, 30 Sept 
2015). Homogeneity in the sodelpa 
response to Bainimarama had clearly 
been breached, even if the Bau/Verata 
cleavage was a poor fit for Opposition 
reconfiguration if only because chiefs 
from both Bau and Verata had become 
closely associated with support for the 
FijiFirst government. Bulitavu, who 
had been arrested some years earlier 
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for defacing road-safety billboards 
featuring Bainimarama’s image, was 
denounced by sodelpa loyalists for 
endorsing the FijiFirst government’s 
destruction of the Great Council of 
Chiefs. 
More evidence of indigenous 
disquiet had emerged in November 
2014, when Nadroga chief Ratu 
Osea Gavidi purported to establish 
a sovereign “Christian state” and to 
have presided over the swearing in of 
eighteen cabinet ministers at Cuvu, 
near the Shangri-La’s Fijian Resort 
(Fiji Sun, 8 Nov 2014). A statement 
from the group echoed familiar ethno-
nationalist themes about alleged Brit-
ish failure at the time of independence 
in 1970 to return Fiji to descendants 
of the original signatories of the 1874 
Deed of Cession. Australian resident 
and indigenous rights campaigner Oni 
Kiriwin, styled “attorney general” of 
the new state, had reportedly been dis-
patched to “Buchigham Palace” [sic] 
to “officially meet Her Majesty THE 
QUEEN” (Fiji Sun, 8 Nov 2014). In 
May 2015, Oni Kiriwin reported on 
her Facebook page that “Almighty 
God” had spoken to her and that the 
Nadroga group had passed into law 
“ten commandments” (Kiriwin 2015). 
In November, sixteen Nadroga chiefs 
appeared before the Lautoka High 
Court charged with sedition and incit-
ing communal violence (Fijivillage, 
26 Aug 2015; rnzi, 7 Nov 2015). 
Gavidi was well known in Fiji for 
crackpot schemes over the previous 
decade but generally not taken greatly 
seriously, at least by urban profession-
als in Suva. In Nadroga, now hosting 
several substantial new resorts and an 
international golf course at Natadola 
Beach, Ratu Osea’s proposal for a 
federal Fiji—with provinces serving as 
Australian-style state governments—
had greater resonance. He died in 
April 2015, but the flag of the would-
be Nadroga-Navosa Christian state 
continued to fly above Gavidi’s bure 
(traditional thatched house) at Cuvu 
until the newly installed Turaga Na Ka 
Levu (paramount chief) of Nadroga, 
Ratu Kinijoji Vosailagi, requested that 
the police take it down in August (Fiji 
Sun, 14 Aug 2015). 
Kiriwin also claimed to be behind 
another secessionist bid in Ra Prov-
ince, in northeastern Viti Levu, and 
in Australia she had separatist flags 
designed for both breakaway “Chris-
tian states.” On 28 October 2014, at 
Uluda in the Nakauvadra Mountains, 
the Ra group denounced the “oppres-
sive, dictatorial and tyrannical nature 
of the Bainimarama/Khaiyum regime” 
with its “nirvana concept of a polity of 
equality” and “dream” of a “modern 
progressive Fiji.” The Uluda Declara-
tion purported to express the aspira-
tions of “ethnic peoples, first nation 
peoples of Fiji and therefore sovereign 
people of this land” and paid hom-
age to Kosovo’s “right to secede 
from an oppressive government.” It 
criticized the government’s “perverse 
form of social engineering which 
employs constitutionally enshrined 
laws of ‘mainstreaming’ with which 
it enforces intensive assimilation that 
selects only the native Fijian race as 
its target group” (Uluda Declaration, 
reproduced in Field 2015). It was no 
accident that the group was making 
its statement from the Nakauvadra 
ranges, onetime home of Navosa-
vakadua and the nineteenth-century 
Tuka cult (see Nicole 2011). In mid-
2014, news filtered out that indige-
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nous Fijians in the Ra hills were being 
trained, using wooden replica guns, by 
a former soldier in the British army. 
Police Commissioner Groenewald said 
the group was “more like a cult” and 
posed no threat to national security 
(rnzi, 14 Aug 2015). 
The reaction of Bainimarama was 
much less relaxed. “There will be no 
so-called independent states in Fiji,” 
he thundered: “Anyone who swears 
an illegal oath will face the full force 
of the law” (fbc, 15 Aug 2015). “We 
Will Crush Any Revolt: pm” roared 
the front page of the Fiji Sun (15 Aug 
2015). In his address at the open-
ing of Parliament, outgoing Presi-
dent Ratu Epeli Nailatikau told the 
assembled members that should they 
fail to condemn the would-be upris-
ing it would “cast doubt” on their 
commitment to democracy (Nailati-
kau 2015). Since the 2013 constitu-
tion had been imposed without any 
referendum or any deliberation by a 
constituent assembly, that argument 
won negligible Opposition support. 
Defence Minister Timoci Natuva 
said that “more influential people” 
were behind the rebels (Hansard, 27 
Aug 2015). sodelpa said it had no 
links with the secessionists (Fiji Sun, 
1 May 2015). In Australia, Fiji-born 
Australian National University (anu) 
Professor Brij V Lal, still banned from 
his homeland, said it was a “diver-
sionary” tactic to deflect criticism 
from the government (sbs, 31 Aug 
2015). Others thought it signaled 
indigenous disorientation in the 
wake of Bainimarama’s abolition of 
the Great Council of Chiefs. On 26 
August, thirty villagers from Ra were 
brought before the court in Tavua 
charged with “sedition” and foment-
ing “communal antagonism,” with a 
heavy military presence on the town’s 
streets (Fiji Times, 26 Aug 2015). By 
the end of August, more than seventy 
dissidents had been arrested and Oni 
Kiriwin had been banned from Fiji 
(rnzi, 25 Aug 2015; Fiji Sun, 29 Aug 
2015). Lawyer Aman Ravindra-Singh, 
representing some of the Ra rebels, 
said that a clerk from his law firm had 
been grabbed and bundled into a car 
by men wearing “military boots” and 
had then been repeatedly “pricked by 
a needle” and “injected” with “some 
sort of liquid” (rnzi, 4 Dec 2015). 
Plans by the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Foreign Relations and 
Defence to look into Singh’s allega-
tions were blocked by the attorney 
general (Fiji Times, 16 Dec 2015). 
Other signs emerged of the still 
fragile security situation. In November 
2015, Police Commissioner Groene-
wald resigned, stating that one reason 
for his departure was government 
cover-up of cases of brutality by the 
security services (abc, 20 Nov, 11 Nov 
2015). He had been appointed in 
May 2014, in the wake of seven and a 
half years of military control over the 
police force. Groenewald had earned 
some popular acclaim by confronting 
five burglars during a restaurant rob-
bery in Flagstaff and forcing them out 
with a chair, leaving himself with inju-
ries that required thirteen stitches (Fiji 
Times, 22 May 2015). He had staked 
his reputation on investigating several 
tricky police brutality cases, includ-
ing the Vilikesa Soko murder case, the 
arrest and beating of Joseva Bilitaki, 
and the assault of Iowane Benedito 
and Epeli Qaraniqio. Vilikesa Soko 
had been arrested for a Nadi robbery 
in November 2014 and died after a 
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vicious beating while in police custody. 
Joseva Bilitaki was a retired teacher 
who had complained of the use of his 
songs by FijiFirst during their 2014 
election campaign, precipitating an 
angry exchange of text messages with 
Bainimarama. Following that corre-
spondence, he was arrested in Decem-
ber 2014 and beaten up by members 
of the security services (rnzi, 10 
Oct, 20 Oct 2015). The most widely 
reported of these cases, the torture of 
recaptured escaped convicts Iowane 
Benedito and Epeli Qaraniqio in 2013, 
was recorded on video and released 
on YouTube. The gruesome footage 
showed five members of the security 
forces beating Benedito with a metal 
pipe in an effort to cripple him and 
setting dogs on Qaraniqio, both as 
punishment for absconding and as 
a method of preventing any repeat 
escape (YouTube, 2013). Suffering 
serious injuries, Qaraniqio had his leg 
amputated shortly thereafter. 
Bainimarama had said at the time, 
“I will stick by my men,” and he 
proved true to his word. The prime 
minister told the media that the 
three police officers and two military 
officers had “done their duty in look-
ing after the security of this nation 
and making sure we sleep peacefully 
at night” (interview on Fiji village, 
9 March 2013). Groenewald’s inves-
tigations were frustrated when the 
three police officers, who had been 
suspended, were recruited into the 
rfmf. Land Force Commander 
Sitiveni Qiliho explained that they had 
been “abandoned by the police” and 
echoed Bainimarama in stating “we 
will stand by our men and women 
through thick and thin” (rnzi, 9 
Nov, 10 Nov 2015), evoking a spirit 
of camaraderie with considerable 
resonance for a coup-prone and heav-
ily militarized state like Fiji. One of 
those implicated was found to be Pita 
Matairavula, formerly the prime min-
ister’s personal bodyguard. The police 
chief had informed Bainimarama of 
his intention to arrest the five officers, 
but the rfmf protected Matairavula. 
As a result, Groenewald—understand-
ably—found his position untenable, 
though his resignation letter also 
included comments about unsani-
tary living conditions (rnzi, 20 Nov 
2015). He returned to South Africa. 
The new acting police commis-
sioner was the rfmf’s Qiliho, who 
had himself been implicated in several 
human rights abuse cases (including 
the 2009 assault on anu historian 
Professor Brij Lal). Lawyer Richard 
Naidu, an Opposition nominee on the 
Constitutional Offices Commission, 
resigned in protest at the appointment. 
On his Facebook page, Naidu said 
that the commission was acting in a 
“haphazard fashion, mostly on the 
basis of last minute emails, reflect-
ing either disorganisation or a lack of 
interest in good governance” (Naidu 
2015). Rivalry between the military 
and the police force had remained 
acute since the military takeover in 
2006, but the brief resurrection of 
police independence under Groene-
wald was soon quashed. Under Qiliho, 
it was announced that most of the 
senior police officers would be retired 
(Fiji Sun, 14 Jan 2016). 
Groenewald was not the only 
official in a top security post to resign 
in 2015. In August, it was announced 
that Brigadier General Mosese Tikoi-
toga had resigned as rfmf com-
mander and that Captain Viliame 
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Naupoto was to take his place in an 
“acting” role. Tikoitoga had only been 
appointed eighteen months earlier, 
after Bainimarama stepped down 
as commander to pursue a career in 
civilian politics. Rumors swirled on 
the overseas blogsites about renewed 
tensions in the rfmf, as well as about 
an awkward extramarital affair. The 
official statement said Tikoitoga had 
resigned to become Fiji’s new high 
commissioner to South Africa. The 
real reason was that Tikoitoga had 
been showing increasing indepen-
dence, replacing those appointed by 
his predecessor to powerful posi-
tions and preventing Bainimarama’s 
personal bodyguards from entering 
the officer’s mess. The South African 
High Commission was a new post 
commenced only in 2011, but in 
November it was announced that Fiji’s 
mission in Pretoria was to be closed. A 
diplomat at the South African mission 
in Suva had been involved in a fatal 
drunk-driving incident in August but 
pleaded diplomatic immunity. The Fiji 
government had asked South Africa to 
waive that immunity (Fiji Sun, 21 Oct 
2015), but without success. Instead 
of the Pretoria post, Fiji would open 
a new embassy in Ethiopia “given its 
strategic importance in Africa” and 
its role in the Organization of African 
Unity (fbc, 19 Nov 2015). It was 
a sign of how far and how rapidly 
Tikoitoga had fallen from grace that 
he would now be deployed to the 
Horn of Africa. 
Aside from the police commissioner, 
the military commander, and the once 
powerful Minister for Infrastructure 
Pio Tikoduadua, many other influ-
ential figures in the Bainimarama 
government resigned during 2015, 
echoing a pattern from earlier post-
2006 coup years. Permanent Secretary 
in the Ministry of Information  Sharon 
Smith-Johns resigned in October, 
 citing personal reasons (Fiji Sun, 29 
Oct 2015). In November, disillusioned 
spin doctor Graham Davis resigned his 
consultancy with Qorvis MSLGroup, 
supposedly to return to Australia 
(Fijileaks, 10 Nov 2015. Qorvis is a 
US-based public relations firm that has 
earned us$20 million globally since 
2010 representing countries with poor 
human-rights records; see cpi 2015). 
Aisake Taito resigned as chief execu-
tive officer of the fnpf in April (Fiji 
Times, 5 May 2015). In November, 
Permanent Secretary for the Minis-
try of Finance Filimone Waqabaca 
resigned to become ambassador to 
New Zealand. Acting Permanent 
Secretary Basundra Kumar departed 
her post in the Ministry of Education 
in December 2014 and in her resig-
nation letter denounced “parochial-
ism, cronyism and favoritism” in the 
ministry, for which she was vigorously 
denounced by her minister, Mahen-
dra Reddy (Fijileaks, 1 Jan 2015; Fiji 
Times, 7 Jan 2015). Dr Neil Sharma, 
the former health minister, resigned 
from Parliament in April. The website 
Fijileaks had revealed that the ficac 
was pursuing charges against Sharma 
for manipulating tendering processes 
(rnzi, 6 Nov 2014). When new per-
manent secretaries were announced 
in December 2015, only three of 
the twenty had been the previous 
incumbents in those roles (Fiji Times, 
18 Dec 2015). 
Ratu Epeli Nailatikau’s term as 
president ended in 2015. A former 
military officer, Major General Jioji 
Konrote, was selected as the new 
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president, the first non-Taukei and 
the first non-chiefly candidate to hold 
the post. The Opposition’s nominee 
was Ratu Epeli Ganilau, the former 
defense minister who had resigned 
from the Bainimarama government in 
2010. Like the departing incumbent 
president, Ganilau is married to one 
of the daughters of Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara, Fiji’s long-serving post-inde-
pendence prime minister (1970–1987, 
1987–1992) and then president 
(1993–2000). That Ganilau now 
featured as sodelpa’s favored choice 
for a president was a sign of how 
closely the Mara dynasty had become 
associated with the Opposition. The 
Gaunavinaka report even speculated 
that Adi Koila Mara—the retiring 
president’s wife and daughter of Ratu 
Mara—might become sodelpa’s 
next leader. At the September 2014 
polls, Lau Province—covering the 
scattered islands of eastern Fiji—was 
the only one of Fiji’s fourteen prov-
inces to record a sodelpa majority. 
Lau is also the ancestral home of the 
Mara family, where Ratu Sir Kami-
sese was Tui Lau and Tui Nayau (see 
Scarr 2008). In October 2015, it was 
announced that the next Tui Nayau 
would be Ratu Mara’s eldest son, 
Ratu Finau (Fiji Times, 3 Oct 2015). 
In Jioji Konrote, the government chose 
a politician with a stellar military 
record but without a strong political 
base. Exiled Professor Brij Lal said 
that Konrote was “widely believed” 
to be keeping “the presidential seat 
warm until Bainimarama is ready to 
move up to Government House after 
another term or two in parliament” 
(Lal 2015). 
The September 2014 election her-
alded the end of international sanc-
tions, but Fiji continued to reposition 
itself on the international front. Echo-
ing debates in New Zealand about 
changing the national flag so as to 
drop its inclusion of the Union Jack, 
Bainimarama announced a competi-
tion in February to come up with a 
new flag for Fiji. “We need to replace 
the symbols on our existing flag that 
are out of date and no longer  relevant, 
including some anchored to our 
colonial past,” said the prime minister. 
“The shield on our flag has the British 
Lion and the Cross of St George,” he 
said, asking, “What does this have to 
do with us?” (Bainimarama 2015). 
The queen has also vanished from 
Fiji’s banknotes and coinage, which 
now feature native birds and fauna 
and national landmarks. The new flag 
would remove the Union Jack and 
escutcheon, the shield on the flag that 
includes depiction of the dove that was 
the symbol of Ratu Seru Cakobau’s 
precolonial 1871–1874 kingdom. 
Another target was the country’s coat 
of arms, which features the escutcheon 
held up by two Taukei warriors, one 
bearing a spear and the other a war 
club. Former Foreign Minister Kalio-
pate Tavola, Fiji’s unsuccessful candi-
date for the position of Pacific Islands 
Forum (pif) secretary-general in 2014, 
wondered whether “our history” had 
been declared a “no go zone” (Tavola 
2015).
In his 2013 New Year’s address, 
Bainimarama had deemed the flag 
change necessary “to reflect a sense of 
national renewal, to reinforce a new 
Fijian identity and a new confidence 
in being Fijian on the global stage” 
(quoted on abc, 2 Jan 2013). Yet 
by mid-2015, market research poll-
sters were reporting that 53 percent 
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of respondents wanted to retain the 
existing flag, and 86 percent wanted a 
referendum on any change (Fiji Times, 
27 June 2015). In June, the National 
Flag Committee released twenty-three 
potential designs for a new flag (rnzi, 
12 June 2015). Bainimarama rejected 
the Opposition call for a referendum 
on the issue. The committee selected 
five finalists but was then instructed 
by the attorney general to seek addi-
tional options (rnzi, 22 June 2015). 
The plan had been to raise the new 
flag on the forty-fifth anniversary of 
independence in October, although 
Bainimarama showed no great urgency 
in finalizing the decision (Fiji Times, 
22 Dec 2015). This was one of several 
issues with potential to offend indig-
enous sensibilities that the prime min-
ister handled cautiously. In the New 
Year, he announced that a new flag, 
preserving only the navy blue color of 
its predecessor, would be hoisted on 
Constitution Day, 7 September 2016 
(Fiji Times, 17 Jan 2016). 
The scheduled February 2015 
meeting in Australia to deliberate 
on changes to the Pacific’s regional 
architecture did not go ahead. The 
Fiji government remained committed 
to a restructure of the Pacific Islands 
Forum so as to diminish the influence 
of—or exclude altogether—Australia 
and New Zealand. Nevertheless, the 
earlier position of nonattendance at 
annual pif summits was softened. 
Although Fiji government officials 
would attend, Bainimarama said 
that “as Head of Government, I will 
not participate in any Forum Lead-
ers’ Meeting until the issue of the 
undue influence of Australia and New 
Zealand and our divergence of views 
is addressed” (Fiji Sun, 7 May 2015). 
New Zealand Prime Minister John 
Key said it was just Bainimarama 
“mouthing off” and hinted none 
too subtly that Australia and New 
Zealand would withdraw funding 
if excluded (rnzi, 13 April 2015). 
Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa 
Sailele Malielegaoi suggested that the 
pif Secretariat headquarters be moved 
out of Fiji and said that Bainima-
rama’s specialty was to “play the 
[military] drum and yell left, right, 
stop” rather than effectively engage in 
regional affairs. The Fiji prime minis-
ter retorted that Tuilaepa was Austra-
lia and New Zealand’s “lapdog” and 
that Canberra and Wellington’s pre-
paredness to “dangle funding in front 
of us” betrayed a “poor view of what 
our relationship should look like” 
(Samoa Observer, 19 April, 26 April 
2015). Other less partisan commenta-
tors sympathized with Bainimarama’s 
call for some reconfiguration of the 
Forum (Fry 2015). 
Fears of growing Chinese influence 
have been a major factor encouraging 
Australia’s 2010–2015 reengagement 
with the Bainimarama government as 
well as with the rfmf. In July, hmas 
Leeuwin became the first Royal Aus-
tralian Navy vessel to visit Fiji since 
the 2006 coup, and it conducted joint 
surveillance of waters around Rotuma 
with the Fiji Navy (Staples 2015). 
According to one analysis, Chinese 
bilateral assistance to Fiji surpassed 
that from Australia over 2006–2013 
(Brandt 2015; Lowy Institute 2015). 
In June, a delegation from China’s 
Guangdong Province signed twenty-
four project agreements with Fiji gov-
ernment and private agencies (FijiLive, 
1 June 2015). Results of Chinese 
assistance have been of mixed quality. 
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The Chinese-constructed Nadarivatu 
hydroelectric dam opened in 2012 but 
has experienced difficulties owing to a 
failure to negotiate conclusively over 
water catchments with local land-
owners (jica 2015, 24), and, more 
urgently, low rainfall over 2014 and 
probably also 2015 (for 2013–2014 
data, see fea 2015). The long-planned 
low-to-medium-cost housing project 
in the Suva suburb of Tacirua never 
got off the ground (Housing Authority 
of Fiji 2015), although 210 Chinese-
constructed public rental flats in Rai-
wai were opened in September 2014 
(Fijivillage, 1 Sept 2014). Chinese 
contractors have been heavily engaged 
in Fiji’s road-building activities, draw-
ing sizable supplies of gravel from 
inland riverbeds. The Nabouwalu-
Dreketi road on northern Vanua Levu 
was completed in late 2015, a f$228 
million project requiring construction 
of fourteen bridges (Fiji Sun, 31 Dec 
2015). 
The costs of Chinese assistance are 
difficult to assess. Competition from 
subsidized Chinese fishing vessels has 
decimated the Fiji fishing fleet, 75 
percent of which is reported as having 
ceased operations over the past five 
years (Fiji Sun, 26 Sept 2015). Never-
theless, some of the established indus-
try players have survived by moving 
both up and down the supply chain. 
Fiji Fish Chief Executive Graham 
Southwick pointed out that “ironi-
cally, we make good money from the 
very boats that are causing us prob-
lems: all the Taiwanese and Chinese 
boats. We have 55 boats supplying 
fish to us that we trade, and we sell 
fuel and bait to these boats and service 
the whole fleet. The money we make 
from this supports our own fleet. . . .
If we had to rely solely on our own 
boats we would have shut down” (Fiji 
Sun, 28 Dec 2015). With regard to its 
own oceangoing activities, Fiji Fish 
has diversified out of tuna to concen-
trate on snapper, mahimahi, and other 
higher-value fisheries exports.
The Bainimarama government has 
cultivated diplomatic relations with 
other nontraditional partners. Fiji now 
has nineteen missions abroad, includ-
ing posts in the Republic of Korea, 
Brazil, and United Arab Emirates, 
costing the country f$42 million per 
annum (Fiji Times, 28 Dec 2015). 
New relationships entail a variety of 
trade-offs. In January 2016, twenty-
five shipping containers arrived in 
Suva from Russia, carrying weapons, 
ammunition, and trucks for Fiji’s 
peacekeepers serving in Egypt’s Sinai 
desert and along the Israel-Syria fron-
tier on the Golan Heights. Ahead of 
their deployment, Bainimarama had 
brokered a 2013 deal with Russian 
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to 
supply the new equipment. In 2014, 
Fiji abstained from voting on the 
United Nations motion condemning 
Russia’s occupation of the Crimea. 
The year 2015 was one of cults 
and invective but also one of tentative 
signs of political reconfiguration. As 
it drew to a close, the Fiji Sun gave 
Bainimarama their “man of the year” 
prize yet again and filled its pages 
with fawning celebrations of “our 
first true people’s prime minister” (Fiji 
Sun, 31 Dec 2015). Letters to the Fiji 
Times likewise applauded the “high 
power” of the prime minister (Fiji 
Times, 27 Dec 2015). Counter-cults 
in Nadroga and Ra had betrayed an 
inward-looking indigenous response of 
seeking to breakaway from the central 
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state. The trading of obscenities inside 
Parliament showed just how person-
alized the power struggle remained 
after eight years of rule by decree 
but also signaled that the Opposition 
was struggling to respond to Fiji-
First’s developmental agenda. On the 
other hand, the FijiFirst government 
had not adjusted easily to civilian 
rule nor relinquished its authoritar-
ian  proclivities. Oddly, as Fiji entered 
its tenth year since the 2006 coup, 
Bainimarama’s government was 
looking ever more like that of his 
arch-nemesis, Sāmoa’s Tuilaepa, with 
its constraints on the Opposition and 
the media, its modernist orientation, 
and its micromanagement of village 
loyalties. 
jon fraenkel
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Timor-Leste
Bitter divisions within Timor-Leste’s 
small political elite have been a 
regular feature of post-independence 
politics. These were aggravated by the 
political-military crisis of 2006 that 
saw a breakdown in the security insti-
tutions and the fall of the first govern-
ment, and by acrimonious disputes 
in the wake of the 2007 and 2012 
elections. Remarkably, interparty 
relations improved dramatically in 
2015 with the emergence of a de facto 
government of national unity between 
the two major parties, the National 
Congress of the Timorese Reconstruc-
tion (cnrt) and the Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor 
(fretilin). This rapprochement saw 
an opposition figure appointed as 
prime minister to facilitate former 
resistance leader Xanana Gusmão’s 
move to the Ministry of Planning and 
Strategic Investment. This conver-
gence in Dili’s political elite built on 
a newfound consensus style of poli-
tics, evident since 2013. But behind 
the political stability and slowly 
improving development indicators 
lay deeper questions of sustainability, 
with finite petroleum resources under 
pressure from large budget expendi-
tures, and a demographic bulge of 
young East Timorese about to enter 
an overstretched labor market. Some 
concerns were also expressed over 
the lack of an effective parliamentary 
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opposition in Dili as 2015 came to a 
close.
Formed in the wake of the 2012 
parliamentary elections, the multiparty 
coalition government Bloku Governu 
Koligasaun (Government Coalition 
Bloc) headed by Gusmão’s cnrt party 
put Timor-Leste’s oldest continu-
ing party, fretilin, once again in 
opposition. Through 2013 and 2014, 
there had been clear signs of public 
rapprochement between the two key 
figures of Prime Minister Gusmão 
and the opposition fretilin leader, 
former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. 
This was evidenced by fretilin’s 
unprecedented support for budget 
votes in Parliament and the appoint-
ment of Alkatiri as the head of a 
major project to develop the exclave 
of Oecusse as a special economic zone.
The long-anticipated resignation of 
prime minister and former resistance 
leader Xanana Gusmão still surprised 
observers in early 2015 when Dr Rui 
Araújo, a high-profile member of 
the opposition party fretilin, was 
appointed as his successor. The new 
prime minister was sworn in alongside 
three new ministers from fretilin, 
who joined a smaller, revamped min-
istry dominated by Gusmão’s cnrt 
party. Though Gusmão’s retirement 
had been on the cards since 2013, and 
a government of national unity has 
been discussed for many years, the 
outcome was still remarkable in light 
of the bitter relations between the two 
major parties as recently as 2012.
Smoothing a difficult political 
transition, Gusmão took the position 
of planning and investment minister, 
a move designed to provide stability 
as the new government took its first 
steps. Given his enormous stature 
in East Timorese politics, Gusmão’s 
departure from center stage was 
a known watch point for political 
stability. This extraordinary remaking 
of the government was also designed 
to smooth the transition from the 
“1975 generation” of leaders that 
has dominated post-independence 
politics since 2002. Gusmão’s continu-
ing presence comes with oversight of 
the National Development Agency, 
which keeps him centrally involved in 
infrastructure policy and will aid the 
new government in its dealings with 
the critical constituency of military 
resistance veterans. Gusmão’s move 
away from direct responsibility for 
defense and police, meanwhile, was 
a significant indication of increasing 
confidence in stability, despite ongoing 
tensions with restive dissident veterans 
groups, including the Sagrada Familia, 
led by disaffected former guerrilla 
commander Cornelio “l7” Gama.
Although Rui Araújo comes from 
the opposition party, his relationship 
with Gusmão dates back to the early 
1990s when he was a clandestine 
messenger in the student resistance. 
After training as a doctor in Indonesia 
and working in Dili in the late 1990s, 
Araújo undertook a master’s degree in 
public health in New Zealand, focus-
ing on models for a new health system 
for Timor-Leste. He served as health 
minister in the first post-independence 
government from 2001 to 2007 and 
was briefly deputy prime minister. A 
widely respected figure, Araújo was a 
political independent until he joined 
fretilin in 2010. Most recently, he 
was a senior advisor to the health and 
finance ministries and is regarded as 
a highly competent and incorruptible 
administrator. These aspects of his 
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public reputation were evidently criti-
cal to Gusmão’s choice (rtp 2015).
That Gusmão was able to per-
suade his own party, cnrt, to back 
this deal, given the known leadership 
ambitions of other senior figures, was 
a testimony to the importance of his 
charismatic authority to their political 
fortunes. In his swearing-in speech, 
the new prime minister described the 
outcome as “a more pragmatic logic 
of serving the national interest . . . the 
coming together of wills, experience 
and skills will allow us to overcome 
the traditional political and demo-
cratic contest, so that we may meet 
the challenges faced by the coun-
try” (Araújo 2015). Araújo warmly 
acknowledged the 1975 generation 
of leaders—Gusmão, former Prime 
Minister Alkatiri, and José Ramos-
Horta, along with current President 
Taur Matan Ruak—as “older broth-
ers,” signaling this moment as one of 
generational change.
Along with the prime ministership, 
fretilin took the key portfolios of 
foreign affairs and agriculture. The 
appointment of Hernani Coelho, a 
former ambassador to Australia, to 
the foreign affairs portfolio showed 
the priority of resolving key issues in 
that relationship, including spying 
allegations and a growing rift between 
the two countries over their maritime 
boundaries. cnrt continued to domi-
nate the rest of the ministerial posi-
tions, with senior figures Agio Pereira 
(minister of state and of the Council of 
Ministers) and Dionísio Babo-Soares 
(state administration and justice) 
retaining major coordinating minis-
tries that saw them continue to wield 
considerable power in the reformed 
government.
Though fretilin insisted the new 
ministers would serve as individuals 
rather than as party representatives, 
there was a clear sense that these 
moves formalized the accord that has 
prevailed between Gusmão and the 
fretilin leadership over previous 
years. Some commentators worried, 
not without justification, that account-
ability might suffer under what is 
effectively a “grand coalition,” albeit 
one best described as a power-sharing 
executive. For more traditional East 
Timorese outside the capital, however, 
this attempt at a consensus politics 
resonates far more closely with local 
notions of political legitimacy than the 
winner-takes-all model of party com-
petition, which is often seen as divisive 
and foreign. If the new power-sharing 
executive performs well, there is a 
strong chance it could be taken to the 
scheduled 2017 elections with rela-
tively minor modifications. It would 
prove a formidable opponent.
For the other, smaller parties in 
Timor-Leste’s former governing 
coalition, the outcome of Gusmão’s 
changes was less appealing. While 
Fernando “Lasama” de Araújo, the 
leader of the Democratic Party (pd) 
and a former leader of the student 
clandestine resistance movement 
Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes 
de Timor-Leste (renetil), retained a 
senior coordinating ministry in social 
affairs and education, the former cnrt 
coalition partner was left playing a 
subsidiary role in the new government. 
In June 2015, Dili was rocked by de 
Araújo’s sudden death of a stroke at 
age fifty-two.
The Program of the Sixth Consti-
tutional Government, issued in April 
2015 (rdtl 2015c), offered some 
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changes in direction, with Prime Min-
ister Rui Araújo pledging to “fight the 
culture of bureaucratisation in pub-
lic administration” and promising a 
“new bureaucratic order that is leaner, 
more professional, more technical 
and less politicised.” He also signaled 
a new economic direction, a halt to 
the “waste and the ineffective use of 
public monies,” and a welcome com-
mitment to economic diversification in 
neglected areas such as tourism, agri-
culture and fisheries (Araújo 2015). 
This shift in political culture toward a 
more “rational-legal” mode of politi-
cal legitimacy, from the charismatic 
legitimacy of Gusmão, borne of his 
historic leadership of the resistance, 
would be a challenging one. Other 
themes of the speech included commit-
ments to finalizing the long-delayed 
Land and Property Law and prioritiz-
ing education spending, particularly to 
encourage women to enter the labor 
market. Welcome commitments to 
fighting domestic violence and making 
the formal justice system more actively 
bilingual were featured. 
The key focus of government 
economic strategy remains the Stra-
tegic Development Plan 2011–2030 
developed by former Prime Minister 
Gusmão. A central component of 
this ambitious plan is a South Coast 
Petroleum Corridor comprising a sup-
ply base in the southern town of Suai, 
a refinery farther east in Betano, and a 
liquefied natural gas (lng) processing 
facility in Beacu. To further this vision, 
major road infrastructure development 
is proposed along the south coast, 
with highway links to Dili. The core 
aspect of this vision relies on onshore 
processing of liquefied natural gas, a 
position that has united East Timorese 
political parties but is not supported 
by the commercial partner in the 
Greater Sunrise gas field, Woodside 
Petroleum. While domestic and inter-
national critics urged the government 
to begin the long process of steering 
the country away from big-money 
megaprojects and the overspending 
of Timor-Leste’s finite oil and gas 
revenues to focus more on health and 
education, the 2015 budget showed 
little sign of diverging from the former 
pattern of high spending on infrastruc-
ture—mostly in the form of contracts 
let to the private sector. In 2015, this 
represented some 36 percent of the 
budget, including the Oecusse Spe-
cial Market Economy Zone (zeesm) 
Authority, which received us$82 
million in public transfers. By com-
parison, expenditures on education 
(9.5%), health (4.6%), and agriculture 
(2.25%) have been modest. Pen-
sion payments to the many veterans 
of Timor-Leste’s long independence 
struggle are a particular focus, repre-
senting 8.7 percent of the 2015 bud-
get, a figure that exceeded the monies 
spent on the security sector (6%) (La‘o 
Hamutuk 2015).
Most growth was driven by govern-
ment spending, drawing on returns 
from Timor-Leste’s petroleum fund, 
which now stands at us$16.22 billion, 
representing its lowest value since 
April 2014. Timor-Leste remained 
highly dependent on petroleum reve-
nues at 95 percent of national income, 
second only to South Sudan in that 
regard, with the small balance domi-
nated by coffee exports. While a new 
middle class thrived on government 
contracts for infrastructure develop-
ment, employment growth from the 
oil revenues was relatively limited. 
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The government’s policy of spend-
ing above the Estimated Sustainable 
Income threshold of Timor-Leste’s 
sovereign wealth fund has been justi-
fied in terms of the need to accelerate 
development, though local nongovern-
mental organizations have warned that 
if government spending is not made 
sustainable, Timor-Leste’s current oil 
wealth could be depleted within ten 
to twenty years, just as a demographic 
explosion of young adults enters the 
labor market. Local nongovernmen-
tal organization La‘o Hamutuk (the 
Timor-Leste Institute for Develop-
ment Monitoring and Analysis, based 
in Dili) estimated that at the current 
rate the petroleum fund would be 
exhausted somewhere between 2025 
and 2035, depending on varying 
scenarios for oil prices and the scale of 
likely remaining deposits in the Timor 
Sea (La‘o Hamutuk 2016). Agricul-
tural spending was not increased 
despite this sector still representing the 
majority of East Timorese subsistence 
livelihoods. In the meantime, Timor-
Leste’s high-cost, low-skills economy 
was proving difficult to diversify, with 
economic activity continuing to center 
on public-sector spending of oil and 
gas revenues, raising the specter of 
the “resource curse,” in which devel-
opment of other more sustainable 
industries is neglected and maladies 
such as political corruption and 
 clientelism may be facilitated. Notably, 
President Taur Matan Ruak vetoed 
the 2016 budget law in late December 
2015, arguing that the budget did not 
adequately tackle the pressing need of 
poverty alleviation.
The five-hundred-year anniversary 
of the arrival of the Portuguese in 
Lifau, Oecusse, prompted a major 
national celebration in 2015. Coincid-
ing with the fortieth anniversary of the 
unilateral declaration of independence 
in 1975, yearlong commemorations 
took place, leading up to the highlight 
of the 28 November celebration in 
Oecusse. A government resolution in 
April created an Organisation Com-
mittee for the Commemoration of the 
five hundred years since the Affirma-
tion of the New Timorese Identity 
(rdtl 2015a). The government 
announced that the commemoration 
was intended “as a starting point, to 
signal the arrival of the Portuguese 
navigators and missionaries to Lifau, 
Oecusse Ambeno, and represents a 
historic mark in the affirmation of 
the new Timorese identity and the 
construction of Timor-Leste” (rdtl 
2015b). Promotion of the yearlong 
commemorations heavily emphasized 
the arrival of the Catholic Church, 
with plans for a reenactment of the 
first arrival of Dominican priests.
Some aspects of official celebra-
tions attracted considerable criticism 
from younger East Timorese, confused 
by what appeared to be a celebration 
of the colonial relationship that had 
initiated generations of forced labor 
and chronic underdevelopment (see, 
eg, Goncalves 2015). For the govern-
ment, however, the focus was clearly 
on the historical relationship with the 
Catholic Church, seen as integral to 
a distinctive East Timorese national 
identity. 
The new prime minister’s com-
mitment to increasing cooperation 
between State and Church was not 
just rhetorical. In August, to com-
memorate the five hundredth anni-
versary of the Portuguese arrival, a 
concordat was signed with the Vati-
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can. These agreements offer particular 
privileges to the Church and have 
been relatively rare since the Second 
Vatican Council. Earlier versions were 
criticized for compromising the sepa-
ration of Church and State, though 
other signatories in recent years have 
included Community of Portuguese 
Language Countries (cplp) members 
Portugal and Brazil (Sainsbury 2015). 
The mass celebrating the concordat 
was convened at Tasitolu, recalling the 
1989 visit of Pope John Paul II that 
saw clandestine independence activists 
unfurl protest banners. The concor-
dat guaranteed a public role for the 
Catholic Church “in line with consti-
tutional norms and local legislation,” 
in providing “spiritual assistance” in 
prisons, hospitals, orphanages, and 
schools. The contrast with the former 
fretilin government’s opposition 
to mandatory religious education in 
state schools was evident, with the 
freedom to profess and practice the 
Catholic faith publicly declared a 
“religious freedom.” The concordat 
had been in development since 2006, 
the time of the Second Constitutional 
Government. Prime Minister Araújo 
noted that the concordat confirmed 
that Catholicism and the Portuguese 
language are “two elements which 
have shaped our identity as a nation” 
(Sainsbury 2015).
The new moderation of politi-
cal conflict also saw the state seek 
to tackle dissident veterans’ groups 
like the Committee for the Popular 
Defense of the Democratic Republic 
of Timor-Leste (cpd-rdtl) who do 
not recognize the 2002 Constitution 
and seek a return to the state declared 
in 1975. In March 2014, Parliament 
had moved to proscribe both the 
cpd-rdtl and the Maubere Revolu-
tionary Council (krm) after members 
wearing uniforms conducted military 
exercises in the Baucau district. By 
mid-2014, tensions surrounding disaf-
fected veterans’ groups appeared to 
calm considerably, only to flare up 
again in January 2015 in a standoff 
between the National Police of East 
Timor (pntl) and the krm, in Laga, in 
Baucau District. Police blockades were 
set up throughout the country in June 
and July to regulate the movements 
of these groups. In August 2015, krm 
leader Mauk Moruk was killed during 
a confrontation with a joint force of 
army and police in Baucau District. 
Despite krm claims of widespread 
support, the country remained calm in 
the wake of this episode. 
Relationships with its two major 
neighbors continued to occupy Dili’s 
diplomats. The Program of the Sixth 
Government committed more stri-
dently to issues of national sover-
eignty, and to “safeguarding the inde-
pendence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of our Nation” (rdtl 2015c, 
77). Most notably, a new Council for 
Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 
was formed in 2015 for the purpose of 
furthering maritime boundaries with 
Australia and Indonesia (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 
2015). In the case of Indonesia, the 
parties agreed on a schedule of major 
maritime boundary delimitation talks 
to take place in 2016 to determine 
some small remaining sections of their 
land border as well as the much larger 
issue of sea boundaries. 
Relations with Australia continued 
at a low ebb, with no formal ministe-
rial visits between the two states since 
2013. The government of Timor-Leste 
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continued its Permanent Court of 
Arbitration case to have the 2006 
Certain Maritime Arrangements in 
the Timor Sea (cmats) treaty voided, 
which delayed maritime boundary 
negotiations for fifty years, following 
allegations from a former Austra-
lian Secret Intelligence Service (asis) 
operative that the Australians had 
spied on the East Timorese negotiat-
ing team in 2004 in order to secure 
a commercial advantage in revenue-
sharing talks. Timor-Leste seeks to 
have the cmats treaty nullified under 
the wider principle, codified under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, that negotiations should take 
place in good faith. In 2015, Timor-
Leste dropped a separate case against 
Australia before the United Nation’s 
International Court of Justice after 
Canberra returned documents seized 
from Timor-Leste’s Australian coun-
sel (Hurst 2015). A third case over 
assessment of pipeline tax revenues in 
the Joint Petroleum Development Area 
also proceeded throughout 2015. In 
the wake of a twenty-four-year fight 
for Timor-Leste’s independence, the 
unresolved maritime border issue had 
become a totemic issue of national 
sovereignty by 2015. Timor-Leste’s 
major political parties have united 
around the need to settle these bound-
aries, a position that appears to have 
strong support in the wider Timorese 
society. 
With elections scheduled for 2017, 
and the historical leadership of the 
country transitioning out of politics, 
Timor-Leste was poised for a genera-
tional shift on the road to democratic 
consolidation. While 2015 saw a wel-
come return to a position of national 
unity and “consensus” politics for 
the first time since the late occupa-
tion era, the key question at the close 
of the year was whether the lack of 
an effective parliamentary opposition 
will create a vacuum for new political 
entrants in 2016. 
michael leach
References
Araújo, Rui. 2015. Speech of the new 
Timor-Leste New Prime Minister on the 
Occasion of the Swearing-in of the New 
Government, Lahane Palace, Dili, 16 Feb-
ruary. http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/02/Swearing-in-of-the-Sixth
-Constitutional-Government-16.2.20151
.pdf [accessed 31 March 2016]
Goncalves, Ivo Mateus. 2015. Civilization 
at What Cost? New Mandala (Coral Bell 
School of Asia Pacific Affairs,  Australian 
National University), 1 December. http://
asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/
12/01/civilization-at-what-cost/ [accessed 
14 March 2016]
Hurst, Daniel. 2015. Timor-Leste 
Welcomes Australia’s Return of Spying 
Documents Seized by Asio. The Guardian, 
3 May. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/may/04/east-timor-welcomes
-australias-return-of-spying-documents 
-seized-by-asio [accessed 14 March 2016]
La‘o Hamutuk. 2015. General State 
Budget 2015. Updated 15 December. 
Available via http://www.laohamutuk 
.org/econ/OGE15/14OGE15.htm 
[accessed 14 March 2016]
———. 2016. Timor-Leste Petroleum 
Fund. Updated 7 February. Available via 
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Oil/PetFund/ 
05PFIndex.htm [accessed 14 March 2016]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Coop-
eration. 2015. The Council for the Final 
Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries. 
Maritime Boundary Office, 4 June. 
political reviews • melanesia 473
how intent the current government 
was to pursue the investigation of 
alleged bribery involving a number of 
members of Parliament (mps) dat-
ing back to the previous year (vdp, 2 
Jan 2015). Indeed, the bribery case 
dominated the news throughout 2015, 
making it the most politically unset-
tled year since Vanuatu’s independence 
in 1980. 
In early November 2014, the local 
press reported that the leader of the 
Opposition, Moana Carcasses, had 
deposited a check for 35 million vatu 
in his personal account at a local bank 
and subsequently transferred sums 
of money ranging from vt500,000 
to vt1 million into the accounts of a 
number of mps (100 vatu [vt] aver-
aged around us$.91 in 2015). Ten 
days later, the prime minister, Joe 
Natuman, and deputy prime minister, 
Ham Lini, lodged a motion in Parlia-
ment to suspend sixteen Opposition 
mps on charges of alleged bribery, 
based on provisions in the Leader-
ship Code that leaders in government 
should conduct themselves so as to 
avoid demeaning their office or the 
integrity of the Republic of Vanuatu. 
The next day, Carcasses tabled a 
motion of no confidence against the 
Natuman government.
Speaker of Parliament Phillip 
Boedoro ruled that the two motions 
should be dealt with in the order they 
were received; thus the bribery case 
against sixteen Opposition mps was 
debated first. Carcasses denied the 
allegation of bribery, claiming instead 
that he had offered the money as 
“loans” to any mp—either Opposi-
tion of Government—who was willing 
to “pledge their allegiance to him.” 
On 25 November, however, Parlia-
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
544602fae4b076f26051926a/t/
55aed867e4b025f8fc5e79ba/
1437522023679/MBO+Booklet
+040615+Med+Res+ENG.pdf 
[accessed 29 March 2016]
rdtl, República Democrática de Timor-
Leste (Government of Timor-Leste). 
2015a. 500th anniversary of the Affirma-
tion of the Timorese Identity. 5 September. 
http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=13165&lang
=en [accessed 21 March 2016]
———. 2015b. Meeting of the  Council of 
Ministers of 14 April 2015. Press release, 
14 April. http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p
=11656&lang=en [accessed 29 March 
2016]
———. 2015c. Program of the Sixth 
Constitutional Government 2015–2017. 
3 March. http://timor-leste.gov.tl/wp
-content/uploads/2015/04/Program-of-the
-Sixth-Constitutional-Government-2015
-2017.pdf [accessed 29 March 2016]
rtp, Rádio e Televisão de Portugal. 2015. 
Rui Araujo sera pm pela sua experiencia e 
conhecimento profundo do sistema finan-
ceiro diz Xanana Gusmao. rtp Notícias, 
9 February. http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/
index.php?article=803330&tm=7&layout
=121&visual=49 [accessed 14 March 
2016]
Sainsbury, Michael. 2015. Timor-Leste 
to Sign Historic Treaty with the Vatican. 
UCANews (Union of Catholic Asian 
News, Hong Kong), 6 August. 
http://www.ucanews.com/news/timor 
-leste-to-sign-historic-treaty-with-the 
-vatican/74035 [accessed 14 March 2016]
Vanuatu
The headline in the Vanuatu Daily 
Post on the first day after the New 
Year holiday—“Police Boss Orders 
Bribery Case Completion”—indicates 
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ment voted for suspension of sixteen 
mps on the basis that the Leadership 
Code specifically states that “a leader 
must not accept a loan (other than on 
commercial terms from a recognized 
lending institution) and only if the 
leader satisfies the lending institution’s 
usual business criteria” (Leadership 
Code Act [Cap 240], part 3—Breaches 
of Leadership, section 21).
The sixteen mps left Parliament and 
remained absent for the rest of the 
session. Carcasses, however, turned to 
the Supreme Court for redress, argu-
ing that “only the court has the right 
to punish anyone and not parliament” 
(vdp, 26 Nov 2014). The court ruled 
in favor of the sixteen mps, stating 
that the motion “to suspend the Peti-
tioners from Parliament amounts to 
breaches of their Constitutional rights 
and is therefore invalid, void and of 
no effect” (vusc 2014). The accused 
mps were, therefore, reinstated. The 
Speaker, however, called for a judicial 
review, arguing that the court’s deci-
sion had “intruded” in the affairs of 
Parliament—that it “interfered with 
the separation of powers between the 
legislature and the judiciary under the 
constitution of the country . . . [and] 
that the Parliament had a duty to act 
to protect its integrity by deciding to 
discipline those members concerned” 
(vdp, 4 Dec 2014). 
Realizing they did not have the 
numbers to proceed, the Opposition 
allowed the motion of no confidence 
to lapse. Nevertheless, Prime Minister 
Natuman responded to the accusa-
tions that had been leveled against him 
as part of the motion. In particular, 
he focused on the airport concession 
agreement signed by the Carcasses-led 
government, which an ad hoc commit-
tee engaged to investigate the project 
had concluded “did not favor the 
government, the people and Vanuatu 
but ‘only foreigners and it could cause 
a catastrophe’” (Van Trease 2015, 
546–547, 554–556). Natuman cau-
tioned that “there were people around 
trying to get the Opposition to return 
to government to reopen the agree-
ment” (vdp, 5 Dec 2014). Whether 
or not there was a link between the 
airport project and the alleged bribing 
of mps remains to be seen, as the whole 
incident has yet to be fully inves-
tigated—in particular, the original 
source of the vt35 million.
The Public Prosecutor’s Office 
began preparing a case against those 
alleged to have been involved in the 
bribery, which it was expected to 
 present in court around mid-March 
2015. The investigations were dis-
rupted, however, due to the devas-
tation inflicted on the country on 
the night of 13–14 March by Super 
Tropical Cyclone Pam—a category 5 
hurricane. Maximum sustained winds 
reached 270 kilometers/hour (167 
mph) in the capitol of Port Vila—mak-
ing Pam one of the worst hurricanes in 
Vanuatu’s recorded history. The storm 
passed down the eastern side of the 
Vanuatu chain, veering westward as it 
neared the central Shepherd group and 
the main island of Efate, where Port 
Vila is located, and continuing in a 
southwestward direction, passing over 
the islands of Erromango and Tanna. 
The islands directly affected by the 
hurricane suffered immense devasta-
tion. Homes and government facili-
ties, such as schools and hospitals, 
were destroyed or severely damaged. 
Most significant was the loss of food 
gardens and water supplies for those 
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people on the outer islands affected 
by the cyclone. Compounding the 
problem has been the onset of an El 
Niño weather pattern over the western 
Pacific, which brought severe drought 
to Vanuatu. Replanting of gardens 
began everywhere after the storm, 
but limited rain meant very slow and 
limited growth. 
Port Vila itself survived somewhat 
better, though most small corrugated-
iron houses lost their roofs or col-
lapsed completely. Electricity was 
knocked out, with estimates of vt200 
million in damages and restoration 
costs (vdp, 27 March 2015), but was 
restored throughout the urban area 
within a month. A representative of 
the International Labor Organization 
present in Port Vila estimated that 
Pam caused vt48.5 billion in eco-
nomic loss to the country (vdp, 5 June 
2015).
Recovery around Port Vila was 
quicker due to the close proximity 
of building supplies and transporta-
tion links through which aid from the 
outside arrived. Eleven people lost 
their lives—but the number could have 
been far greater if not for the early 
warnings provided by the Vanuatu 
Meteorological Service and aware-
ness among the country’s population 
of what to expect and how to protect 
themselves when a hurricane strikes 
(vdp, 19 March 2015).
Countries from around the world 
offered their assistance with Vanuatu’s 
traditional aid donors—Australia, 
France, and New Zealand—provid-
ing immediate donations of food and 
materials for reconstruction. All three 
committed their military air, sea, and 
ground forces to transport supplies 
into the country and to assist in its 
distribution to the outer islands. 
The United Nations and most of the 
major international nongovernmental 
organizations offered assistance and 
many sent representatives to oversee 
its distribution and work with local 
communities. 
The Vanuatu National Disaster 
Management Office was up and 
running from day one and put in a 
 tremendous effort to deal with the 
 crisis. It was soon clear, however, that 
the biggest problem was not in attract-
ing enough aid, but managing its dis-
tribution (vdp, 20–24 March 2015). 
Rumors circulated around Port Vila of 
heated discussions between the direc-
tor, who was determined to insure that 
Vanuatu officials and organizations 
should maintain oversight and control 
over the dispatching of relief supplies, 
and representatives of some aid orga-
nizations. 
The Opposition picked up on this 
issue when it finally broke its silence 
two weeks after the hurricane, Car-
casses accusing the disaster manage-
ment office of lacking transparency 
and not providing “guarantees that 
any shipment will be received by [the 
institution or organization] to whom 
it is being consigned” (vdp, 28 March 
2015)—the implication being that 
certain groups were being favored 
for political advantage. The response 
from Prime Minister Natuman was 
that members of the Opposition were 
merely trying to “capitalize on a situ-
ation and exploit the people’s misery 
and suffering for their own political 
gains” (vdp, 30 March 2015).
For the most part, however, politics 
remained quiet following Cyclone 
Pam until early May, when it was 
announced that Prime Minister Natu-
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man had decided to reshuffle his cabi-
net, replacing the existing minister of 
youth and sport, Don Ken (National 
United Party member for Malakula), 
with John Lum (Nagriamel member 
for Santo). It was said that Nagriamel 
had requested the move and the prime 
minister declared that it was only fit-
ting that the two parties—Nagriamel 
and Vanua‘aku Pati—should be work-
ing together, as they both had been 
prominent in the struggle for indepen-
dence (vdp, 6 May, 8 May 2015). That 
they had been on opposite sides of the 
rebellion seems to have been forgotten 
and reflects possible changing political 
alliances. 
A few days later, the “elephant 
in the room” suddenly made itself 
known again. After more than five 
months—on 8 May—the Court of 
Appeal handed down its decision on 
the case, which Speaker Boedoro had 
lodged against the decision of the 
Supreme Court to reverse the action of 
Parliament on 25 November 2014 to 
suspend the sixteen mps (see above). 
The presiding judges ruled in favor of 
the mps, concluding that the decision 
to suspend them infringed their consti-
tutional rights and was “invalid, void 
of no effect” since no criminal offense 
had been proved (vdp, 11 May 2015).
The judges went on to say, however, 
that they accepted “that Parliament is 
legitimately concerned about con-
duct of members outside Parliament 
where their conduct might damage 
the integrity of Parliament” and that 
if allegations of misconduct have been 
established and the facts proved, “Par-
liament is then free to act as it thinks 
appropriate on the facts established by 
the courts” (vuca 2015a). The Court 
of Appeal, in effect, did not dismiss 
the charges out of hand, only the basis 
on which they had been made. 
While Opposition mps may have 
felt a sense of relief, their problems 
were far from over, as the police were 
still investigating the bribery charges. 
This, most likely, explains the decision 
of Carcasses to again lodge a vote of 
no confidence against the government, 
which coincided with the termina-
tion of two additional ministers in 
the Natuman-led government—Sato 
Kilman (foreign affairs) and Alfred 
Carlot (justice)—who were replaced 
by two members from the Opposi-
tion—Kalvao Moli and Hosea Nevu. 
Natuman explained to the press that 
the main reason for Kilman’s removal 
was that he had misrepresented the 
collective position of the government 
on a recent visit to Indonesia with 
regard to West Papua, when he sug-
gested that Vanuatu was preparing to 
open an embassy in Jakarta. Vanuatu 
governments on both sides of the 
political divide had long supported the 
West Papuan struggle and had taken a 
strong stand recently in favor of West 
Papua membership in the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group. Kilman’s comment 
appeared to be sending the wrong 
signal. 
Likewise, Natuman related how 
Kilman, on a recent visit to Russia, 
had made contact with a so-called 
foreign minister of Abkhazia, when 
the firm position of the Vanuatu gov-
ernment was that Abkhazia is a part 
of Georgia with whom the govern-
ment has bilateral relations (vdp, 5 
June, 10 June 2015). It would seem 
that Kilman continued to maintain 
links with representatives of Abkhazia 
dating back to late 2011, when he 
was prime minister and authorized 
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recognition of the breakaway prov-
ince involving questionable payments 
of money to Thi Tam Goiset, who 
had been appointed Vanuatu’s roving 
ambassador to Russia and other east-
ern European countries (Van Trease 
2014, 529). 
The reasons given for the no-con-
fidence motion included removal of 
the Opposition mps from Parliament, 
which was claimed to be unconsti-
tutional; unfair distribution of funds 
and supplies relating to Cyclone 
Pam; alleged misuse of funds relat-
ing to the visa scheme operating in 
China; and claims that the prime 
minister was leading the country in 
the wrong direction with regard to 
economic development. Subsequently, 
the two dismissed ministers, along 
with several of their supporters in the 
government, moved to the Opposi-
tion when the first ordinary session 
of Parliament convened the next day, 
providing the majority necessary to 
topple the Natuman government. 
Sato Kilman, president of the People’s 
Progressive Party, became the new 
prime minister, with Moana Carcasses 
(Greens) as deputy (vdp, 6, 8, 9, and 
12 June 2015).
In response, less than twenty-four 
hours after losing the government, the 
new Opposition tabled a motion of no 
confidence against the Kilman-led gov-
ernment, which the existing Speaker, 
Philip Boedoro, ruled in order. When 
Parliament met again on 16 June, 
the new government voted to replace 
Boedoro with Marcellino Pipite from 
the Vanuatu Republican Party—one 
of the sixteen mps under investigation 
for bribery. Having taken over the 
Speaker’s position, Pipite then ruled 
that the motion of no confidence was 
not in order and closed Parliament 
(vdp, 17 June 2015). 
In response, the new Natuman-led 
Opposition filed an urgent constitu-
tional application with the Supreme 
Court, seeking a declaration from the 
Court that Speaker Pipite’s closing of 
the first ordinary session of Parliament 
on the 16th was unconstitutional. The 
grounds given in the application were 
that the original motion of no confi-
dence against Kilman had been ruled 
in order and, therefore, could not be 
ignored—that is, that the decision to 
adjourn Parliament without allowing 
the motion to be debated had denied 
the applicants their constitutional 
rights (vusc 2015b). Subsequently, 
the Supreme Court upheld the Oppo-
sition application and declared that 
Parliament was still open and that the 
decision by Pipite to close Parliament 
was unlawful and in breach of the 
constitutional rights of the applicants 
(vdp, 18, 19, and 25 June 2015). 
Pipite countered with an appeal 
against the decision (vdp, 29 June 
2015), and a stay order was issued, 
extending the date for reconvening 
Parliament to 2 July (vdp, 30 June 
2015). When Parliament met, the 
Opposition withdrew its motion for 
lack of numbers needed to topple 
the Kilman government (vdp, 3 July 
2015). Some three weeks later, the 
Court of Appeal handed down its 
judgment relating to Pipite’s appeal, 
ruling in favor of the Speaker (vuca 
2015b). The argument given was that 
Speaker Boedoro did not comply with 
Article 43 (2) of the Vanuatu Constitu-
tion by listing the motion of no con-
fidence for debate on 18 June 2015, 
less than a week after he received it. 
According to the constitution, “At 
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least 1 week’s notice of such a motion 
shall be given to the Speaker.” Pipite’s 
response was to demand an apology 
from Boedoro during the next sitting 
of Parliament (vdp, 28 July 2015). 
The bribery case itself was 
adjourned by the Magistrate Court 
to 23 June, due to the ongoing First 
Session of Parliament (vdp, 13 June 
2015) and again to 14 July (vdp, 
24 June 2015), due to delays in the 
preparation of necessary documents. 
Meanwhile, the prosecution made an 
application to prevent the defendants 
from interfering in the work of police 
investigators—that they be prohibited 
from “interfering ‘directly’ and ‘indi-
rectly’ with prosecution witnesses” 
(vdp, 24 June 2015).
Just at this complicated juncture, 
the nation was shocked to learn of 
the sudden death of one of its senior 
politicians, the leader of the Opposi-
tion, the Honorable Edward Nipake 
Natapei, who passed away at the age 
of sixty-one due to a sudden illness. 
Natapei was from the island of Futuna 
in the southern islands and began his 
political career in 1983, representing 
the Vanua‘aku Pati as the constitu-
ency’s elected member of Parliament. 
In 1988, he was asked by the party 
to move to the Port Vila constituency, 
where he was elected and served a 
total of eight terms. During his time in 
Parliament he had held the position of 
prime minister three times, Speaker of 
Parliament and, since 1999, president 
of the Vanua‘aku Pati (vdp, 29 July 
2015).
On 7 August, a preliminary court 
hearing finally took place during 
which the acting public prosecutor, 
John Timakata, brought charges under 
the Leadership Code Act and Penal 
Code Act against eighteen members 
of Parliament, of whom seven were 
ministers of state. Those charged 
included the deputy prime minister, 
Moana Carcasses Kalosil (Port Vila, 
Green), who was alleged to have 
corruptly offered loans of up to vt1 
million to individual mps. Other min-
isters alleged to have offered or taken 
bribes included Iauko Group members 
Thomas Laken (Tanna), Tony Nari 
(Pentecost), and Hosea Nevu (Santo). 
Two members of the Reunification 
Movement for Change included Paul 
Telukluk (Malakula) and Stephen 
Kalsakau (Efate). Willie Jimmy (Port 
Vila) was a member of the Vanuatu 
Liberal Democratic Party, and Serge 
Vohor (Santo) was a member of the 
Union of Moderate Parties (ump). 
Members of Parliament also listed 
included ump members Silas Ratan 
(Tanna) and Tony Wright (Port Vila); 
Kalvau Moli (Luganville, Indepen-
dent); John Amos (Tongoa, People’s 
Progressive Party); Green members 
Arnold Prasad (Santo) and Jean Yves 
Chabot (Port Vila); Sebastien Harry 
(Tanna, Iauko Group); Marcellino 
Pipite (Santo,  Vanuatu Republican 
Party); Jonas James (Paama, Natatok); 
and Robert Bohn (Epi), member of 
the Vanuatu Progressive Development 
Party. In addition, longtime business-
man Thomas Bayer—the nineteenth 
individual in the case—was charged 
with alleged complicity in bribery 
and corruption under the Penal Code 
Act (vdp, 7 Aug 2015). The accused 
were placed on bail pending their plea 
appearance the following week. 
When Supreme Court Justice Mary 
Sey announced the start of the trial—
scheduled to last for two weeks, begin-
ning on 2 September—she noted that 
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the number of defendants had been 
reduced from 18 to 16 due to the deci-
sion of the Public Prosecutor to grant 
immunity to two of the charged who 
had agreed to provide evidence—mps 
Kalvau Moli and Hosea Nevu, both 
from Santo. Two additional mps, who 
had not been charged, were also given 
immunity.
When the Court convened, the min-
ister of finance, Willie Jimmy, pleaded 
guilty to the two charges laid against 
him: one count of corruption and 
bribery of officials contrary to section 
73 of the Penal Code (Cap 135) and 
one count of acceptance of loans con-
trary to section 21 of the Leadership 
Code Act (Cap 240). He had provided 
a written statement to police prior to 
the convening of the trial (vdp, 3 Sept 
2015). 
All sixteen remaining defendants, 
who were divided into two groups—
the “givers and receivers” of the 
alleged bribes—pleaded not guilty 
to the charges. Tom Bayer, the only 
non-mp, was charged with one count 
of complicity to bribery contrary to 
section 21 of the Leadership Code Act 
and one count of complicity to corrup-
tion and bribery contrary to section 
73 of the Penal Code Act. The court 
granted permission to separate his trial 
from that of the others, which would 
be dealt with following the  conclusion 
of the main trial (vdp, 3 Sept 2015).
Opposition leaders Joe Natuman 
and Ham Lini spoke out strongly 
against the unfolding situation. They 
pleaded in a news conference for 
Prime Minister Kilman to cease his 
overseas travel and attend to the con-
stitutional crisis facing the nation—the 
undermining of the “integrity of the 
institutions and the offices we hold.” 
They described the scene in which 
ministers and mps arrived in their 
black cars, flying national flags, to 
face charges against them of bribery 
and corruption, “as a mockery of the 
lowest grade and detestable in the 
eyes of the law. Such is unheard of 
anywhere in the world.” As one of the 
defendants, Deputy Prime Minister 
Moana Carcasses, dismissed a plea 
from the Opposition for Prime Minis-
ter Kilman to reshuffle his cabinet and 
remove all those involved in the case, 
labeling the charges against him and 
his colleagues as “politically moti-
vated” (vdp, 5 Sept 2015).
The trial, which lasted for two 
weeks, was presided over by Supreme 
Court Justice Mary Sey, who is from 
Gambia and had been seconded by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat to 
Vanuatu in September 2014 from the 
High Court in Swaziland. On the first 
day of the trial, Judge Sey began by 
formalizing the conviction of Finance 
Minister Willie Jimmy. She announced 
to him that he was convicted on his 
own guilty plea and, since he had done 
this at his earliest opportunity, she 
was mandated to give him a “substan-
tial reduction in whatever sentence 
is meted out to you. You have not 
wasted the Court’s time and you have 
shown remorse” (vdp, 8 Sept 2015). 
The prosecution presented twenty-
four witnesses, including a Westpac 
Bank representative who testified to 
an inward transaction of us$500,000 
from China Construction Bank 
Corporation Limited in Hong Kong 
via banks in the Netherlands and the 
United States to the account of the 
Pacific International Trust Co Ltd 
(pitco), owned and operated by Tom 
Bayer. It was further revealed that 
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Bayer authorized conversion of the 
money into Vatu (vt48.9 million) 
of which “vt35 million was paid 
through a check by the pitco Vatu 
trust account to Moana Carcasses 
on 28 October 2014.” The Westpac 
representative confirmed the trans-
fer of vt1 million to the accounts of 
two of the accused mps, and an anz 
Bank representative confirmed—the 
result of a search warrant the bank 
had received—that large sums were 
also transferred to the accounts of the 
other twelve mps charged (vdp, 9 Sept 
2015). 
The prosecution’s case then focused 
on the purpose of the money transfers 
and the conditions under which the 
loan agreements were signed.  Kalvao 
Moli—one of four mps who had 
been granted immunity for providing 
information—provided key evidence. 
He testified that Moana Carcasses, 
then leader of the Opposition, had 
“made known to him of a loan scheme 
that mps could borrow from . . . but 
Moana said he is offering vt1 million 
as the loan on the condition that he is 
made Prime Minister” (vdp, 10 Sept 
2015). The prosecution also called a 
number of mps to testify, who claimed 
to have turned down the offer of 
money in return for a signature on a 
motion of no confidence against the 
Natuman government (vdp, 11, 12, 
14, and 15 Sept 2015).
The defense case was short and 
tried to establish that the money was 
intended as a loan to mps to use in 
their constituencies. mp Hosea Nevu—
another mp who had been granted 
immunity—testified that the agree-
ment was “between myself and the 
Green Confederation Development 
Fund . . . [and] to my understanding, 
the loan agreement had nothing to do 
with the motion of no confidence.” 
Moreover, he stated that, as an Oppo-
sition mp, “it was his duty to sign any 
motion against the government” (vdp, 
16 Sept 2015). In addition, the various 
defense councils presented submissions 
to the court on behalf of their clients 
that there was “no case to answer” 
and that the “evidences are irrelevant 
to their clients.” Judge Sey rejected the 
submissions, ruling that “the accused 
persons have a case to answer” (vdp, 
17 Sept 2015).
As part of her ruling, Sey explained 
that the accused were entitled to 
defend themselves by calling witnesses 
or to give evidence themselves, or they 
could choose to remain silent. All of 
the fifteen accused facing criminal 
charges had pleaded not guilty, but 
at this point only Robert Bohn, mp 
for Epi, decided to speak in his own 
defense. He explained his understand-
ing of the loans as being provided 
to a select group of mps to use “for 
good works and development in the 
constituencies of Vanuatu and it is 
the people that would benefit from 
these good works.” He stated that 
the agreement was verbal between 
him and mp Carcasses, without any 
conditions. Moreover, he noted that 
he had known Carcasses for “25 
years, as a friend, a business associate, 
and more recently, as a colleague in 
Parliament”—the implication being, 
that such a loan would not have been 
unusual or improper (vdp, 18 Sept 
2015). 
Judge Sey handed down her verdict 
on the 9th of October (vdp, 10 Oct 
2015). The Court found Carcasses 
guilty of eighteen counts of offering a 
bribe; thirteen of the defendants guilty 
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of accepting a bribe in breach of 73 
(1) and (2) of the Penal Code; and 
one of the defendants, Robert Bohn, 
not guilty (vusc 2015e). Following 
his conviction, Deputy Prime Minister 
Carcasses announced that he respected 
the verdict and appealed for calm. 
It is significant to note that on the 
day prior to the handing down of the 
verdict, Supreme Court Justice Daniel 
Fatiaki ruled that the ombudsman had 
not made a proper inquiry and report 
into the conduct of the members of 
Parliament who had been convicted 
of bribery under the Leadership Code, 
nor had he given them the “opportu-
nity to reply to the complaints made 
against them” (vusc 2015a). As a 
result, Judge Sey decided that the 
charges of breaches of the Leader-
ship Code would be set aside and the 
defendants would only be tried for 
breaches of the Penal Code Act (vusc 
2015e).
Then, unbelievably, the people of 
Vanuatu were shocked to learn the 
 following day, 10 October 2015, that 
the Speaker and acting president, 
mp Marcellino Pipite, had signed an 
instrument of pardon for himself and 
thirteen other mps (including Car-
casses), who had been convicted of 
bribery the previous day. The docu-
ment was gazetted by the State Law 
Office on Sunday, 11 October 2015. 
Willie Jimmy, who had pleaded guilty, 
was not included. Pipite, as Speaker 
of Parliament, had assumed the posi-
tion of acting president during the 
absence of President Baldwin Lonsdale 
from the country, as provided for in 
the Vanuatu Constitution (chapter 6, 
section 37[1]). As such, he took the 
action to pardon himself and his fel-
low convicted mps, based on the pro-
vision in the constitution that states: 
“The President of the Republic may 
pardon, commute or reduce a sentence 
imposed on a person” (chapter 6, 
 section 38). 
Citing political disturbances that 
had occurred in the past in Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea, Pipite 
explained in a press conference that 
“as leader, symbol of peace and unity, 
I do not want to see a similar situ-
ation happening in Vanuatu.” It is 
significant to note that everything was 
peaceful and calm in Port Vila. Pipite’s 
announcement was clearly uncalled 
for and could have had precisely the 
opposite effect, undermining order 
and stability. The mood in Vanuatu 
was one of shock, but there were no 
public disturbances. In any case, given 
the fact that none of the convicted 
mps had been sentenced, it is doubtful 
whether a pardon was legally possible 
at that point (vdp, 12 Oct 2015). 
mp Pipite also used his new posi-
tion of power to suspend the ombuds-
man, Kalkot Mataskelekele. Claim-
ing gross misconduct, Pipite’s action 
 followed the ruling by Judge Fatiaki 
(as noted above) against the ombuds-
man regarding his alleged failure to 
conduct an adequate inquiry or pro-
duce a proper report as required under 
the Leadership Code. The ombudsman 
responded by requesting the State Law 
Office to appeal the judgment (vdp, 
9 Oct, 13 Oct 2015). The issue of the 
alleged violation of the Leadership 
Code was especially important to the 
convicted mps due to the provision 
therein that would bar a leader from 
holding office for ten years if con-
victed of a criminal act. 
On his return to Vanuatu, President 
Lonsdale expressed his deep  sorrow 
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for what had been affecting the 
country, noting that “the important 
institutions of the country continue 
to deteriorate and operate outside the 
Constitution . . . no one is above the 
law . . . it is my duty to remind every 
citizen that the Constitution is the 
Supreme Law, and everything that we 
do in this country must be guided by 
it” (vdp, 13 Oct 2015). On 15 Octo-
ber 2015, the president revoked the 
pardons. 
The following day, Speaker  Pipite 
and ten other convicted mps and their 
four lawyers—the group who met 
and conspired to have themselves 
pardoned—were arrested and charged 
without bail on suspicion of “con-
spiracy to defeat the course of justice.” 
Prime Minister Sato Kilman, who 
had finally returned from overseas 
travel, removed mps Paul Tulukluk, 
Tony Nari, Tony Wright, and Thomas 
Laken from their ministerial portfolios 
(vdp, 17 Oct 2015). Willie Jimmy con-
tinued on for the moment as minister 
of finance. All those arrested were 
released several days later on strict 
bail conditions. 
Both the Opposition bloc and 
the convicted mps launched judi-
cial reviews, which were joined and 
dealt with together by the Supreme 
Court. In his judgment, Justice Oliver 
Saksak made the point that the case 
was incomplete, as sentences had yet 
to be delivered, and noted that “a 
pardon granted under Article 38 of the 
Constitution does not acquit a person 
of a conviction, but redeems a person 
from a sentence.” He surmised that 
the haste with which the pardon docu-
ment was drawn up—signed, sealed, 
and published in the Official Gazette 
over a single weekend—could indicate 
an attempt by the Speaker and other 
convicted persons to “stop Crimi-
nal Case no. 73 (Bribery case) from 
proceeding towards its end, when 
sentences would be handed down on 
22 October.” The Court ruled that the 
pardon by convicted mp and Speaker 
of Parliament, Marcellino Pipite, was 
void and of no effect (vusc 2015c; 
vdp, 21 Oct, 22 Oct 2015). 
Needless to say, the Opposition 
welcomed the convictions, proclaim-
ing that “convicts have no place in 
public affairs,” and called for the 
Kilman government, which still held 
power despite the conviction and 
imprisonment of fourteen of its mem-
bers, to step aside for the good of the 
country. “The prime minister’s con-
tinued silence in the face of calamity 
brought about by the El Niño-induced 
drought and the nation’s brush with 
anarchy, demonstrates his incapabil-
ity in running national affairs any 
longer” (vdp, 12 Oct, 14 Oct 2015). 
The problem they faced, however, was 
that Kilman refused to move aside and 
simply juggled the portfolios of the 
discredited members of his parliamen-
tary majority. The Opposition finally 
lodged a motion of no confidence, but 
it was declared out of order when it 
failed to secure the required twenty-
seven signatures needed to call a spe-
cial session of Parliament (vdp, 20 Oct 
2015). When Parliament is in session, 
only seven signatures (one-seventh of 
the fifty-two members) is required on 
a motion.
Sentencing of the convicted mps 
finally took place on 22 October 
2015. Carcasses was sentenced to four 
years in prison, Toni Nari to three 
and a half years, and the remainder 
to three years each. They were imme-
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diately incarcerated and remained in 
prison for the rest of the year. Willie 
Jimmy, who had pleaded guilty, was 
sentenced to twenty months’ imprison-
ment, suspended during good behavior 
(vusc 2015f). The Court of Appeal 
rejected the appeals by the defendants, 
upholding both the convictions and 
the sentences in their entirety (vuca 
2015c; vdp, 20 Nov 2015).
In early November, prior to the 
appeal ruling and with the fourteen 
mps in jail, a delegation of chiefs from 
Sanma, Malampa, Penama, Shefa, and 
Tafea provinces suddenly appeared 
in Port Vila, announcing that they 
had come to perform a “customary 
reconciliation” ceremony using high-
value custom pigs known as ravwe 
and traditional mats, which they had 
brought with them. The rumor around 
Port Vila was that the trip and attempt 
at intervention had been organized 
by the brother of one of the convicted 
mps and paid for by the Board of 
Directors of the Northern Islands 
Stevedoring Company Ltd (niscol). 
They apparently hoped to influence 
the president to grant pardons to the 
convicted mps. 
The delegation asked Chief Seni-
mao Tirsupe, the president of the 
Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs, to 
facilitate a meeting with President 
Lonsdale as the head of state. Echo-
ing the feeling of many leaders, Chief 
Tirsupe received them respectfully 
but resisted their move to become 
involved, noting that “there is a time 
for everything and as such things must 
happen at their appropriate time.” 
Likewise, the leader of the Opposi-
tion, Joe Natuman, cautioned the 
chiefs that “the Head of State must be 
allowed to make his decision based on 
his free will and not due to pressure” 
and sent them a letter explaining that 
the legal appeals process must first 
be completed before any reconcilia-
tion ceremonies could take place. The 
chiefs never met with the president 
and returned home (vdp, 2, 3, 4, and 
6 Nov 2015). 
Contributing to the political 
stalemate was the fact that, although 
the fourteen convicted mps had been 
removed to jail after sentencing on 
22 October 2015, they were still not 
required to vacate their seats in Parlia-
ment. They were counted as part of 
the sitting Kilman government and 
continued to receive their salaries. 
Under the Members of Parliament 
(Vacation of Seats) Act, an mp con-
victed of a crime is allowed thirty 
days to appeal before being obliged to 
relinquish his or her seat. They would, 
therefore, continue to hold their seats 
at least until 21 November, when the 
thirty-day window lapsed, depending 
on the outcome of their appeals. The 
same applied to mp Willie Jimmy, who 
was free on good behavior. As a result, 
following the convictions, Prime 
Minister Kilman continued to hold 
onto power, commanding a majority 
of 28 out of a total of 52 mps, which 
included the 15 convicted mps. Parlia-
ment was not in session, so the fact 
that they could not take their seats 
made no difference for the moment. 
Attempts by the Opposition during 
this period to persuade Kilman to 
hand over power or form a govern-
ment of national unity failed. Indeed, 
Kilman was successful in winning over 
two Opposition bloc members, Don 
Ken and Isaac Hamariliu, by offering 
them ministerial portfolios (vdp, 24 
Oct, 28 Oct 2015). After 21 Novem-
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ber, when their appeals were dismissed 
and the 15 convicted mps officially 
vacated their seats, Parliament’s num-
ber was reduced to 37, made up of 13 
government mps and 24 Opposition, 
who then commanded the majority. 
Nevertheless, the political stale-
mate continued, as Kilman refused to 
authorize the recall of Parliament for 
the constitutionally mandated Second 
Ordinary Session. The first session 
had taken place in May/June, but a 
second session had never been con-
vened. Kilman clearly had no intention 
of summoning Parliament, since the 
Opposition with their new majority 
would easily have defeated his minor-
ity government in a vote of no confi-
dence. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the failure of Parliament to meet 
deprived Kenneth Natapei (Vanua‘aku 
Pati)—who had recently won a by-
election to replace his father in one of 
the Port Vila seats—the opportunity to 
be sworn into office (see above). This 
would have added another member to 
Opposition numbers and was an issue 
that they would include in a subse-
quent court challenge of the presi-
dent’s decision to dissolve Parliament 
(vusc 2015d). 
The other option was a dissolution 
of Parliament, which Kilman actually 
favored and the Opposition opposed. 
Delegations from both the government 
and the Opposition had met with the 
president at the end of October and 
discussed the situation. It was reported 
over Radio Vanuatu that Kilman had 
asked President Lonsdale to dissolve 
Parliament—a power vested in the 
president alone—in response to a 
request from the Council of Ministers. 
Despite the fact that on 16 October 
the Council of Ministers had agreed 
to request a dissolution, the president 
did not act. His position was that 
there was still time for the parties to 
reach an agreement and dissolution 
would be a “last resort” (Vanuatu 
Daily Digest, 26 Oct 2015). It would 
seem that the president preferred to 
wait until the appeals of the fifteen 
convicted mps had been heard. If the 
appeals were upheld, the mps would 
resume their posts and a dissolution 
would not be necessary (Vanuatu 
Daily Digest, 31 Oct 2015). 
On 20 November, the day on which 
the Court of Appeal announced that 
the appeals of the fifteen convicted 
mps had been rejected, the Opposi-
tion filed an urgent constitutional 
application with the Supreme Court 
to order the Speaker to call the Second 
Ordinary Session of Parliament for 
2015 (vdp, 20 Nov 2015). However, 
before the Court had met, Acting 
Speaker Samson Samsen announced 
that Parliament had been scheduled to 
meet on 14 December (vdp, 23 Nov 
2015). It came as a surprise, therefore, 
when the president announced the 
next day that he had dissolved Parlia-
ment—especially since a resolution to 
the political impasse was at hand with 
the announcement of a date for the 
Second Parliamentary Session. 
The president gave as his reasons 
the need to reestablish a strong func-
tioning government due to the delay in 
dealing with the aftermath of Cyclone 
Pam and a decline in service delivery. 
Likewise, he pointed to the unneces-
sary costs of holding by-elections for 
the fifteen convicted mps (the fourteen 
imprisoned plus Willie Jimmy), given 
the fact that the national election 
was not scheduled to be held until 
late 2016. He mentioned that he was 
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aware of the decision to recall Parlia-
ment but decided as he did due to the 
long period of unstable government 
that had occurred and for “the welfare 
of the public of Vanuatu” (vdp, 25 
Nov 2015). 
The following day, the Opposi-
tion filed a case against the decision 
of the president, requesting that it be 
declared null and void (vdp, 26 Nov 
2015). The submission questioned 
the delay between the request by the 
Council of Ministers for a dissolution 
and the decision of the president—
over five weeks—at a time when the 
prime minister was running a minor-
ity government. It also questioned the 
issue of the composition of the council 
on the day the decision was made, “as 
only ten (10) members attended the 
meeting instead of all the Ministers 
[13 . . . and] that five of the ministers 
who attended the meeting were con-
victed in the bribery case [and] were 
yet to be sentenced” (vusc 2015d).
The possibility of bias and conflict 
of interest was also raised, noting that 
the president had accepted a custom 
ceremony from the prime minister 
involving an exchange of a pig and 
he giving one in return, leading to the 
suspicion that the government was 
receiving special treatment. Council 
for the president argued that under 
the Vanuatu Constitution (paragraph 
28 [3]), the president has unfettered 
authority to make such a decision. The 
Supreme Court agreed and dismissed 
the case (vusc 2015d). 
The decision to dissolve Parliament 
coincided with rumors circulating that 
the president was about to pardon 
the jailed mps, which his office firmly 
denied, noting the legal process that 
would be required and the current 
political circumstances: “It is too 
early to consider such, as it will make 
a mockery of the justice systems in 
Vanuatu” (vdp, 27 Nov 2015). 
The main issue for the Opposition 
regarding a dissolution was that it 
would leave Kilman and his ministers 
in power as a caretaker government 
to continue what they viewed as 
 corrupt practices. For example, there 
were rumors that the new minister of 
lands, Paul Telukluk, was intending 
to  intervene in a case against Lands 
Department staff who were issued 
state land leases by the former minis-
ter of lands, Steven Kalsakau, without 
tendering for land and assets valued 
greater than vt15 million (vdp, 16 
July, 17 July 2015). 
While awaiting the court decision 
on the challenge to the president’s 
decision to dissolve Parliament, the 
Electoral Commission went ahead 
and announced that a “snap” elec-
tion would be held on 22 January 
2016 (vdp, 4 Dec 2015). The Elec-
toral Commission moved quickly, as 
the constitution (paragraph 28 [4]) 
requires that an election must take 
place not earlier than thirty days and 
not later than sixty days following the 
dissolution of Parliament. 
Another unexpected development 
occurred at this time, concerning the 
application of the Leadership Code 
in relation to the Penal Code Act. As 
noted above, the Leadership Code 
stipulates that a conviction under the 
Penal Code Act is automatically a 
breach of the Leadership Code and 
makes the individual concerned liable 
to dismissal from office and disquali-
fied from appointment to public office 
for a period of ten years. The interpre-
tation of the link between the Leader-
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ship Code and the Penal Code was 
what led to the dismissal of charges 
of bribery and the suspension of mps 
in December 2014—that is, that the 
defendants had not been found guilty 
of bribery before being suspended 
from Parliament. 
Judge Sey had been careful to 
charge the accused mps under the 
Penal Code, leaving the issue of 
breaches under the Leadership Code 
to be dealt with later. This followed 
a ruling by Judge Fatiaki on 9 Octo-
ber—the day before Judge Sey handed 
down her judgments for the fifteen 
mps (as noted above)—that there had 
been a breach of the Ombudsman’s 
Act related to the production of an 
official report by the ombudsman. 
Subsequently, however, the Court of 
Appeal ruled that Judge Fatiaki’s judg-
ment was “not binding on Judge Sey” 
and that she “should have proceeded 
to determine the Leadership Code Act 
charges despite the decision of Justice 
Fatiaki” (vdp, 4 Dec 2015). 
As a result of this clarification, 
the newly appointed public prosecu-
tor, Josiah Naigulevu, applied to the 
Supreme Court for a ruling in view of 
the convictions handed down under 
the Penal Code. Judge David Chet-
wynd ruled that he was “satisfied 
beyond any doubt that the breaches 
were and are serious” and confirmed 
orders “dismissing all the Defendants 
from office and disqualifying them 
from standing for election or being 
appointed as a leader of any kind for 
a period of 10 years.” He also ruled 
that the defendants were not entitled 
to “payments or allowances” since 
their dismissal and that disbursements 
that may have been paid prematurely 
should be recovered—that is, the 
defendants were “ordered . . . to repay 
them forthwith” (vusc 2015g; vdp, 8 
Dec 2015). Thus, after a tangled series 
of judicial procedures, the fate of the 
accused mps had been resolved—at 
least for the moment—though the 
issue of reduced sentences or pardons 
would continue to be discussed. 
There was, however, unfinished 
business relating to the bribery case 
that would have to wait until the 
following year: Quite significant was 
the “conspiracy to pervert the course 
of justice” case involving ten of the 
convicted members of Parliament who 
had conspired with their four lawyers 
for Marcellino Pipite, as acting presi-
dent, to issue a pardon for all the con-
victed mps including himself—exclud-
ing mp Willie Jimmy, who had pleaded 
guilty. Yet to be heard was the “com-
plicity to bribery” case related to the 
source of the large amounts of money 
loaned by Carcasses to members of 
Parliament, the source of which was 
traced to pitco and its manager, local 
businessman and financier Thomas 
Bayer (Paterson 2015). 
Also on the immediate agenda for 
2016 was the national election, sched-
uled for 22 January. By mid-December, 
prospective candidates were lodging 
their documents with Electoral Office 
officials and unofficially beginning to 
campaign. There were rumors that the 
fourteen jailed former mps were trying 
to manipulate their followers from 
inside, and several were said to be 
planning to run—expecting most likely 
a miracle or Christmas gift in the form 
of a pardon, which the  president had 
made clear was not going to happen 
anytime soon (vdp, 22 Dec 1015). 
The political chaos that began in 
late 2014 and continued to unfold 
political reviews • melanesia 487
in 2015 was unprecedented in the 
short history of Vanuatu, and yet 
life remained remarkably peaceful 
throughout. For example, follow-
ing the death of senior politician 
Edward Natapei, a by-election was 
held in mid-October 2015 for his Port 
Vila constituency, which coincided 
with the announcement of the guilty 
verdicts and Pipite’s illegal pardoning 
of convicted mps. The turnout was 
low, which is not unusual for Port 
Vila—around 10,236 out of 38,324 
registered voters cast their ballots—
but the poll took place peacefully, as is 
the normal practice. Kenneth Natapei, 
representing the Vanua‘aku Pati, was 
elected with 4,281 votes to replace his 
father, and the election results were 
announced on the day that the gov-
ernment mps and their lawyers were 
arrested following the cancellation of 
the illegal pardons. The elections of 
the Luganville Municipal Council and 
the Sanma Provincial Government also 
took place during 2015 without issues 
or problems.
Vanuatu gained its independence 
a mere thirty-six years ago, accom-
panied by a rebellion that involved 
violence and divided the population. It 
is, perhaps, the remembrance of that 
painful experience—and a desire that 
it should never be allowed to hap-
pen again—that has led the people of 
Vanuatu over the years to develop a 
confidence in the work of the judiciary 
and the rule of law. This was clearly 
evident during 2015, when unprec-
edented challenges to Vanuatu’s insti-
tutions of government were overcome 
through the patient work of the court 
system—achieved without any public 
violence or social unrest. 
howard van trease
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